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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce and Managem~nt. 
Regional Variation In 
New Company Failure Rates: 
A Comparative study of New Zealand's 
Three Main Urban Centres 
by Brynn Burrows 
This study examined the new company failure rates of New Zealand's three main urban 
centres (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch). The populations of newly registered 
companies within the three main urban areas in 1987 were used and consisted of 5413 
companies in Auckland, 2219 companies in Wellington and 1235 companies in 
Christchurch. To allow for greater validity two measures of failure were used. These 
measures differ in their concentration and were discontinuance for any reason and 
liquidation. 
The Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch company popUlations were treated as a 
representative sample of New Zealand companies, and a national new company failure rate 
was calculated. Along with the national company failure rate, regional company failure 
rates were calculated and compared using survival analysis techniques. The log-rank, 
Breslow and Tarone-Ware tests for equality were computed providing evidence of small 
levels of variation in new company failure rates between the three urban areas. Based on 
the measure discontinuance for any reason, Auckland registered companies had the best 
survival chances, Wellington registered companies had the second best survival chances 
~-;::~:~-:~;~~~;::: 
~~~~~~~ 
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and Christchurch registered companies had the worst survival chances. Based on the f;-:":·~'>·...:~r;~':'-:-
t::'::~=-=-~:::~:.:-;.:~; 
measure liquidation, however, Christchurch registered companies had the best survival 
chances, Wellington registered companies had the second best survival chances and 
Auckland registered companies had the worst survival chances. 
The Cox regression model with time-varying covariates was used to measure the 
explanatory power of the five independent variables (Consumer Price Index, 
unemployment, average weekly wage, average house price and population). From this a 
final model was constructed consisting of three variables that effect regional variation in 
new company failure rates (unemployment, Consumer Price Index and average house 
price). 
The findings of this study confirm previous concerns relating to the deficiency of 
database management by the Ministry of Commerce Companies Office. It was 
recommended that the procedure used in this study be replicated periodically and the 
results presented in the form of a regional risk index. Other limitations of this study are 
discussed along with the identification of directions for further research. 
Keywords: New company failure, regional variation, regional risk index, discontinuance 
for any reason, liquidation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The term failure is' the "non-achievement of a prescribed standard of performance", and is 
accompanied by feelings of embarrassment, inadequacy, self-doubt and shame (Steadman 
& Bohle, 1987). The researcher believes that the degree of failure and the effects of failure 
vary considerably. For example, if a student fails an examination the effects of this failure 
reside in particular with that student. If, however, a company fails, the effects of the failure 
can be far reaching. The failure of a company can affect managers, employees, investors 
and their families, and can also "impose a substantial strain on the economic and social 
resources of the community as a whole" (Ling & Mathews, 1982). 
Ling and Mathews (1982) also suggest that company failure is part of the reality of 
free-market western economies. New Zealand has been ranked as having the "fourth freest 
economy in the world" (Matthew, 1996) and also faces this "reality". Although the 
negative implications of company failure are stressed and well documented in the 
literature, there are also positive implications of failure. Steadman and Bohle (1987) 
suggest that failure provides opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors to react 
constructively by evaluating performance and improving on it and to learn from their 
mistakes. Trial and error learning is imperative to the existence and development of 
companies and humans alike, if lessons are not learned from failure same mistakes will be 
repeated (Steadman & Bohle, 1987). 
2 
An accurate probability of failure is particularly important when developing 
expectations concerning success or failure. The rate of new company failure "has often 
been quoted under conditions of misconception" (Watson & Everett, 1996). The main 
source of this "misconception" stems from the use of differing measures of failure and the 
sources of data used (Watson & Everett, 1996). This study uses two measures of failure: 
discontinuance for any reason, and liquidation in order to measure the rates of new 
company failure in New Zealand. The use of two measures of failure will allow the reader a 
degree of freedom in their interpretation of the results and associated conclusions. 
This study will base the national rate of new company failure in New Zealand on 
the measures above. The primary focus of this study is on the presence of regional 
variations in new company failure rates between New Zealand's three main urban centres 
(Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch). The study examines the degree of variation in 
new company failure rates among the three centres, and possible reasons for this variation. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The broad problem area addressed in this thesis is the misconception of many people that 
new businesses 1 have an extremely high mortality rate. This misconception has resulted in 
the pessimistic views of individuals about the likelihood of a business's success, and hence 
has deterred individuals from starting their own business (Sullivan, 1996). The myth, 
believed by individuals, that new businesses have an extremely high mortality rate can also 
result in a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the individual fails in business because they 
considered it to be inevitable (Sullivan, 1996). 
1 The terms business and company are used interchangeably as although this study is specifically focused on 
companies, a company is a business and is therefore related. 
3 
There have been numerous studies conducted worldwide to determine new business ;-,-'-.'-'-',.-,', 
failure rates within individual countries (Hutchinson, Hutchinson & Newcomer, 1938; Star 
& Massel, 1981; Tauzell, 1982; Stewart & Gallagher, 1985; Reynolds, 1987; Dunne, 
Roberts & Samuelson, 1989; Gaskill & Van Auken, 1993; Bates, 1995). New Zealand 
examples include Skillen (1989), Alexander & Palmer (1992) and Turner (1984). These 
studies, however, report mixed findings concerning the rates of business failure, because 
they use different measures of failure and different databases. There are also relatively few 
studies worldwide that investigates regional variation in new business failure rates within a 
country. 
The research undertaken in this study stems directly from work conducted by 
Skillen (1989). In Skillen's study of the survival rates of New Zealand companies for the 
period 1973 to 1984, the Christchurch area was used as representative ofthe entire country. 
Skillen recognised this problem of generalisation, but suggested that: 
a) there were no known differences between the mix of businesses in Christchurch and 
elsewhere in New Zealand in 1973 and; 
b) there occurred no unique disasters, physical or financial, between 1973 and 1984 that might 
mean that Christchurch results were unrepresentative of business conditions in other parts of 
New Zealand. 
Skillen did acknowledge the possibility that there might be regional variations in 
new company failure rates, and that this topic was one worth future research. Turner (1984) 
reiterated this suggestion in his study, which was based on the Otago area. 
The development of a regional profile of new company failures may be of particular 
use to credit providers and potential entrepreneurs, as the profile would provide an 
indication of the relative risk associated with each of the three main centres (Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch) for the period studied (1987-1998). For credit providers such 
4 
knowledge may influence the relative interest rates in a particular area and for 
entrepreneurs it may influence decisions concerning company location. 
The segmentation of regions within this study may highlight the presence of general 
and specific economic environments, as proposed by Hall (1972) and Kimberly (1979). 
The degree of regional variation in new company failure may indicate the relative 
importance of genet:al and specific economic environments; it may also encourage 
management to monitor these comparative environments. The presence of specific 
economic environments in a geographic area, would indicate that business conditions 
within one region are not representative of those in other regions, and would contradict 
generalisations, such as those made by Skillen (1989) and Turner (1984). 
1.2 The Purpose of this Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine new company failure rates in New Zealand, using 
1987 as the base year and following progress for an II-year period. The study will then 
ascertain if there is regional variation in new company failure rates between New Zealand's 
three main centres: Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch for the same period. The 
scope of this thesis does not allow for definitive causes of new company failure to be 
determined. The researcher has, however, assessed factors within the specific economic 
environments, such as unemployment, average weekly wage, average house price, 
Consumer Price Index and the social factor popUlation. This may provide the reader with 
an insight into any regional variations in new company failure that may be found. 
1-·--· ._--
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1.3 Aim and Objectives of Thesis ~<-:, ~:. :-,:<~:~.::.: 
M~E~;~:: 
The aim of this study is to provide information that will assist credit providers in assessing 
the relative risk involved with funding a new company and potential entrepreneurs who are 
starting a new company, in each of the three main centres in New Zealand. With this aim in 
mind, the following, objectives have been set. 
1. Determine the rate of new company failure in New Zealand over an II-year period with 
the base year 1987, using the measures discontinuance for any reason and liquidation. 
2. Ascertain the extent or degree of variation (if ~my) in the rate of new company failures 
between New Zealand's three main centres (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch) 
for the period studied. 
3. Assess factors in the specific economic environment (population, unemployment, 
Consumer Price Index, average weekly wage, and average house price) that may explain 
any regional variation in new company failure rates for the period studied. 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
This thesis is divided into five separate chapters. The rationale, objectives and purpose of 
the study are addressed in this first chapter. Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature 
available to the researcher including the four main measures of company failure and past 
research that has been undertaken by other researchers overseas and in New Zealand based 
on these four measures. Chapter Two then focuses on industry specific failure rates, the 
liabilities of Newness, Smallness and Adolescence, and reported causes of failure, 
6 
including both endogenous and exogenous factors. The chapter investigates the concept of 
general and specific economic environments. Economic profiles are provided for 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, which include measures of population, rates of 
unemployment, industry mix, Consumer Price Index, average weekly wage and average 
house price. Chapter Two concludes by advancing several research questions that are 
addressed in later chapters. Chapter Three outlines the design and methodology used in the 
study, specifically: the sample, measures of failure, database used in the research and the 
procedures employed to analyse the data collected. The quantitative results of this study are 
presented in Chapter Four. Finally, Chapter Five discusses the findings of the research, and 
the implications these findings have for credit providers, and present and future 
entrepreneurs. Finally, the associated limitations of the study are discussed with potential 
future research directions being proposed. 
!-- ,- >- > -.--
1:.,.,.:-:-:-:.:-:.:-:-
t . ~ : -: -. - -. -.. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Review of the Literature 
This chapter will investigate the literature relevant to company failure. First, the chapter 
will address the importance of an appropriate measure for company failure, by 
investigating four commonly used alternatives. The study assesses the merits and problems 
attached to each alternative and outlines the findings of past studies that use any of these 
four measures. Next the review discusses industry-specific failure rates, the liabilities of 
Newness, Smallness and Adolescence and illustrates the endogenous and exogenous causes 
of failure with support from past research. The chapter then discusses concepts of general 
and specific environments and develops area profiles for Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch, based on local economic and social conditions. Finally, the review presents 
research questions and related hypotheses. 
2.1 Measure of Failure 
First this study sets out to develop an appropriate measure of company failure, with reliable 
data to support it. In the past researchers have not succeeded in developing a reliable 
measure of company failure. The lack of a reliable measure has created a major obstacle to 
our understanding of causes of failure (Cochran, 1981) and has lead to the growth of myths 
and half-truths concerning failure rates (Scott & Lewis, 1984). 
-----.-',-,' .. 
-.-~.~~-~---:.-:<.'.-
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2.1.1 Four Selection Criteria r:<_'. -" i ..-~_.~~~-,.; _._~, ~_',. oW 
Watson and Everett (1993) have identified four criteria that are important when a 
researcher is selecting a measure for company failure. The first of these criteria is the 
degree of objectivity or verifiability of the measure. The objectivity of the measure is 
important because i~ allows researchers to replicate the study and to generalise about the 
results. The second of these criteria is the relevance of the measure. In this sense the 
measure must represent what it purports to describe. The third criterion is the reliability of 
the measure. The measure must be free from any bias that may alter the results and 
conclusions. The fourth and last criterion is simplicity. If the measure is simple it will 
ultimately reduce the likelihood of bias and result in the study being replicated easily in the 
future. 
It is generally accepted that there will be a degree of compromise when a researcher 
selects a measure of company failure (Watson & Everett, 1993). A researcher may have to 
make a trade-off among these four criteria and select one criterion over another for the ',.---< -
purpose of their particular study. 
2.1.2 Four Previously Used Measures 
The four measures of company failure used in past studies range from broad to narrow. The 
first of these measures is discontinuance for any reason. Discontinuance can thus entail 
either change of ownership, or closure (Watson & Everett, 1993). Fredland and Morris 
(1976) suggest that discontinuance for any reason is indeed an appropriate measure of 
failure as resources have usually been shifted to more profitable opportunities. Garrod and 
Miklius (1990) also support this measure by suggesting that it is often "difficult to 
distinguish between change of ownership and exit". It is perhaps worth noting, however, 
.9 
that the sale of a business does not necessarily mean that the business failed. It may have 
been given up due to the owner's illness, retirement or because of the availability of more 
attractive opportunities (Churchill, 1952). 
On applying the four selection criteria discussed in Section 2.1.1, the researcher 
finds the measure discontinuance for any reason to be objective and simple. The measure 
may, however, be bjased if sole traders and partnerships are treated differently, and it may 
not be particularly relevant, because the measure does not necessarily represent failure 
(Watson & Everett, 1993). 
The second measure, offered by Dun and Bradstreet (1979), is bankruptcy with loss 
to creditors. The use by a researcher of this very specific measure implies that a business 
that is continuing, or that ceases without loss to outside creditors, is regarded as non-
failing. The problem with this measure is that a business may cease trading with substantial 
losses to owners, or may still be operating with negative cash flows and profits and not be 
considered to be failing (Watson & Everett, 1993). 
The bankruptcy with loss to creditors measure of business failure is objective, 
relatively simple and may have relevance for credit providers. But, for the purposes of this 
study the measure has little relevance because it neglects to report businesses that have 
ceased trading with loss to owners which, in fact, constitutes failure (Watson & Everett, 
1993). This measure may also lead to bias because large businesses are more likely to be 
placed into formal bankruptcy due to their large borrowings being greater than those 
incurred by small businesses (Watson & Everett, 1993). 
Ulmer and Nielsen (1947) offer the third main measure: disposed of to prevent 
further losses. This measure focuses on the disposal of a business (sold or liquidated) with 
losses, and with further losses anticipated. In this context the measure includes owners' 
capital and may not involve loss to creditors (Watson & Everett, 1993). Ulmer and Nielsen 
._,.,- .. ,., .... -
~~::~:~7;=.:::-:~:: 
f?'---:-~;"::~-:::::--;::-7 
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(1947) found that in their study of 1,650 discontinued companies, 34 percent of business 
I' ".. -. ~ - , 
~-_.-.- _ .• ~.:~ v __ -;:' ~ 
t:~~1:~~t~~~ 
turnovers were sold or liquidated to prevent further expected losses. 
This measure is an improvement on Dun & Bradstreet's measure: bankruptcy with 
loss to creditors, because it encompasses loss to owners and not just creditors. Fredland & 
Morris (1976), however, believe that an accurate measure of failure should address the rate 
of return on investment. In this sense the rate of return should not only be positive, but also 
be proportionate to the business's opportunity costs (Watson & Everett, 1993). Ulmer and 
Nielsen's measure: disposed of to prevent further losses, does not consider the economic 
variable of "rate of return", when measuring business failure. 
On applying the four selection criteria of objectivity, relevance, reliability and 
simplicity the researcher found the third measure to be more relevant than the two previous 
measures. The measure: disposed of to prevent further losses, however, is not simple nor is 
it objective. The measure relies to a considerable extent on the opinion of someone 
associated with the business (Watson & Everett, 1993). Also, due to the difficulty for 
researchers in obtaining data, this measure could be difficult to verify (Watson & Everett, I· ~. - '. -
1993). 
The fourth and final measure is Cochran's (1981) measure failing to make a go of 
it. This measure encompasses businesses that fail to obtain an adequate rate of return, along 
with businesses that cease with loss of owners' or creditors' capital (Watson & Everett, 
1993). Although this measure is possibly the most relevant, it is extremely subjective in 
nature. It would rely entirely on the opinion of someone associated with the business and 
hence any results would be difficult to verify (Watson & Everett, 1993). 
It would appear then that no one best measure of business failure exists (Watson & 
Everett, 1993). Yet it is essential for a researcher to select a measure because the measure 
determines how general the study is, the ultimate results and it's conclusions. The 
researcher is therefore guided by: the expected audience (business brokers, credit 
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providers, potential owners, advisers to small business and policy makers), and the· 
availability of data. 
2.1.3 Company Failure Rates 
It is claimed that there is a misconception on the part of researchers in their quoting about 
the extremely high failure rates of new and small businesses (Watson & Everett, 1996). 
Table 2.1 Previous measures and related failure rates 
Discontinuance 
Author(s) Year Reported Failure Rate Source of Data 
Hutchinson, Hutchinson, & Newcomer 1938 31.5% (Year 1) Directories 
67% (Year 5) 
Churchill 1952 33% (Year 1) Department of Commerce 
71% (Year 5) 
Star & Massel 1981 67% (Year 5) Retailers Occupational Tax Database 
Tauzell 1982 35% (Year 4) Department of Economics Security 
Hamilton 1984 4.8-6.4% Per Annum Factory Inspectorate 
Price 1984 3% Per Annum Chamber of Manufacturers 
Ganguly 1985 9% Per Annum VAT Register 
Birley 1986 4% Per Annum Service Unemployment Records 
5% Per Annum Mfg 
Stewart & Gallagher 1985 8.1 % Per Annum Dun and Bradstreet Reports 
Reynolds 1987 9% Per Annum Surveys 
Cooper, Dunkelberg, & Woo 1988 11 % (23 Months) Questionnaires 
Bates and Nucci 1989 7.5% Per Annum Census Information (U.S.) 
Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson 1989 45% (Year 5) I RS Employment Records 
Phillips & Kirchoff 1989 60% (Year 5) Dun and Bradstreet Reports 
Baldwin & Gorecki 1991 6.5% Per Annum Census Information (U.S.) 
Dekimpe & Morrison 1991 3.9% Per Annum Franchise Chain Information 
Williams 1993 31% (Year 5) Dun and Bradstreet Reports 
Bates 1995 45% (Year 8) for Franc. Questionnaires 
23% (Year 8) Independ. 
Bankruptcy/loss to creditors 
Massel 1978 0.43% Per Annum Dun and Bradstreet Reports 
Cahill 1980 0.7-1.3% Per Annum Department of Industry Records 
Lowe, McKenna, & Tibbits 1991 66% of Failures <10 Yrs Information from Insolvency Practice 
Hall & Young 1991 32% of Failures <3 Yrs Official Receivers Reports 
To prevent further losses 
Ulmer & Nielsen 1947 33% of Failure to prevent Surveys 
loss 
66% of Failure <6 Years 
Failed to make a go of it 
Small bone 1990 37% within 2.5 Years Case Studies of an Enterprise Agency 
Gaskill & Van Auken 1993 71% of Discon. "Failed to Sales Tax Information & Survey 
make go of it" 
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The accuracy of the measure has a major influence on the recorded level of business 
failure. The lack of accuracy makes it very difficult to draw comparisons between studies, 
unless a constant measure has been used. In addition data is often inferred from databases 
that have been compiled for different reasons, and this may also add to the distortion or 
confusion (Watson & Everett, 1996). To clarify this issue, Table 2.1 compares previous 
research results, se~menting underlying research methods by measures used and by data 
source. From Table 2.1 it is evident that the measure, which is used by the researcher, has a 
considerable effect on the level of failure reported. 
2.2 Industry Specific Failure Rates 
It has been found by researchers that business operations in the retail sector generally have 
relatively higher failure rates than in other sectors (Heilman, 1935; Hutchinson et aI., 1938; 
Black, 1946; Churchill, 1955; Etcheson, 1962; Phillips & Kirchoff, 1989; Reynolds, 1987). 
This rate of failure may be the direct result of issues such as lower barriers to entry 
including lower initial capital investment, less expertise needed and regulatory laws. The 
result of this is a higher number of entrants with fewer skills and less expertise. Therefore 
the business struggles along for the first few years and inevitably fails. Preisendorfer and 
Voss (1990) support this suggestion and found that on average the founders of retail 
businesses were at least two years younger than those in manufacturing. It took 
approximately 16.8 months for 25 per cent of the retail units to go out of business 
compared with 24.6 months for manufacturing. The sample of businesses used by the 
researchers reflected the difference between sector entry rates with 37,221 retail businesses, 
versus 2,793 manufacturing businesses being included. 
Industries can generally be segmented into manufacturing, wholesale, construction, 
service and retail (Preisendorfer & Voss, 1990). Other authors, however, have added 
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categories such as transport, professional, other services, motor trade (Stewart & Gallagher, 
1985) and minerals (Freeman, 1982). Some researchers have gone further and segmented 
industry types into individual industry sectors. Audretsch (1991), for example, broke 
manufacturing down into segments and found that the survival rate "varies considerably 
across manufacturing sectors .. ; 10 year survival rate of paper, non-electrical machinery, 
primary metals being 40 per cent and petroleum, apparel, furniture, transport equipment 
and leather being 27 per cent." 
Another example of industry segmentation is shown in a study conducted in 
America by Star and Massel (1981) that looked at different retail sectors. They found that 
there were large variations in the industry survival rates. Lumber yards, farm and garden 
supply stores, hay and grain suppliers, drug stores and hardware businesses showed high 
survival rates. Whereas fruit and vegetable markets, candy stores, eating places (without 
alcoholic beverages), bakeries and gasoline stations showed low survival rates. Star and 
Massel (1981) also suggested that "selection of another time period might well alter the 
- .. 
survival rates of these and other categories", indicating the relevance of time periods 
examined. 
The variation in the industry rates of business failure may result in those areas that 
are characterised as having a high concentration of a particular industry, being more 
susceptible to failure. This was found in a number of studies including Converse (1932); 
Starr and Steiner (1939); Lane and Schary (1991). 
2.3 Liabilities of Newness, Smallness and Adolescence 
There are three major theories that have arisen from previous studies concerning new 
company failure. These theories are outlined in the following sub-sections. 
~::-::~;~:::::.:.:::~i:;: 
t';-;-~:~~~>~7-: 
, .. 
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2.3.1 Liability of Newness " ~." ." ~--~-,--:.". 
(;::;" i:':'..;~-;;~:;~~~ 
It is easy to see why there is so much misconception by researchers concerning the actual 
rates of failure. Both the measures and data sources vary considerably making comparisons 
difficult. Most researchers agree, however, that company 'death' rates decrease as age 
increases (Converse, 1932; Vaile, 1932; McGarry, 1939; Hutchinson et al., 1938; Starr & 
Steiner, 1939; Hicks & Crowder, 1943; McGarry, 1947; Churchill, 1955; Brady & 
Montgomery, 1959; Kinnard & Malinowski, 1960; Mayer & Goldstein, 1961; Marcus, 
1967; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983). That is, 
"organizations are most likely to die in the first few years of operation" (Carroll, 1983). 
This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
The theory behind this concept is that a young company faces a number of barriers 
to market entry. These include: product differentiation, technological barriers, licensing 
and regulatory barriers, vertical integration, illegitimate acts by competitors and 
experiential barriers to entry (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Along with these external barriers ---.,-.--.--'., 
there are also a number of internal liabilities of newness. For example, the creation and 
clarification of roles and structures in order to become efficient and the ability to attract 
qualified employees to enable this to happen (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). 
" .' - --;'. ~. 
2.3.2 Liability of Smallness 
Along with this liability of newness most new companies also face the problem of 
smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). The theory behind the liability of smallness concept 
involves difficulty in the raising of capital (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). This includes raising 
"seed capital" for expansion, meeting temporary cash flow problems, and covering 
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payment of the high interest rates that are inherent in businesses obtaining venture capital 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). 
Aldrich and Auster (1986) also suggest that the tax laws in America (also in New 
Zealand) work against small companies. For large companies, the money borrowed to 
acquire small companies is tax deductible. In addition for the small company owner, the 
favourable tax treatment of capital gains as opposed to income, makes selling out attractive 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). 
Another factor of liability of smallness is that government regulations tend to weigh 
more heavily on small companies than on large companies (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). The 
main reason for this is that a large company can afford internal specialists and separate 
departments that deal with various government rules and regulations (occupational health 
and safety, product safety and zoning for example). The owner(s) of a small company, 
however, must themselves bear the full burden of government reporting (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986). 
Finally, the smallness of a company compounds the liability of newness when that 
company is competing for quality labour (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). In this sense a small 
company lacks the internal labour market and the resources to provide training and 
development that a larger company possesses. In addition, a small company provides little 
or no job security, vertical promotion and career advancement opportunities (Aldrich & 
Auster, 1986). 
There have been a number of studies conducted that test for the liability of 
smallness phenomenon. Star and Massel (1981) examined the survival rates of retailers 
from 1974 to 1979 and reported survival rates by size, based on annual sales of: 31 percent 
(under $240,000), 54 percent ($240,000-$1,200,000), 64 percent ($1,200,000-$2,400,000) 
and 92 percent (over $2,400,000). Birch (1979) reported similar findings as Table 2.2 
indicates. The figures that are reported in Table 2.2 suggest that non-survival rate is high 
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for small businesses regardless of the length of their establishment. The higher failure rates "-'--.,:: .. -~- ,-.' 
reported for new businesses in each size category (except for businesses with 501+ 
employees) also support the theory behind liability of newness. 
Table 2.2 Mortality rate of U.S. establishments 
Mortality rates of U.S. establishments, by age and employment size: 
Per cent establishments active in 1969 that were out of business 
by December 31, 1976 
Establishment size Age Percent 
No. of employees (Years) Not surviving 
0-20 0-4 63 
5-9 54 
10+ 50 
21-50 0-4 46 
5-9 34 
10+ 26 
51-100 0-4 44 
5-9 35 
10+ 25 
101-500 0-4 44 
5-9 35 
10+ 23 
501 0-4 --_. 33 
5-9 37 
10+ 16 
Total, all sizes 0-4 62 
5-9 52 
10+ 48 
All All 52 
Source: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, as reported in Birch (1979) 
Freeman, Carroll and Hannan (1983) found in their study of national unions, semi-
conductor electronics manufacturers and newspaper publishing companies that "initial size 
has large and significant effects on rates of disbanding ... ". These studies, along with others 
by Heilman (1935), Hutchinson et al. (1938), Mayer and Goldstein (1961), Paustian and 
Lewis (1963) and Wedervang (1965), provide empirical support for the liability of 
smallness theory. It should be noted, however, that a number of other empirical studies 
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have failed to find any correlation between size and subsequent failure rates (Frasure, 1952; 
McKean, 1958; Woodruff & Alexander, 1958; Fredland & Morris, 1976). 
2.3.3 Liability of Adolescence 
Bruder! and Schussler (1990) rejected the liability of newness concept in favour of a 
liability of adolescence theory. This theory states that risks rise for an initial period and 
then decline afterwards (Bruder! & Schussler, 1990). The initial period is said to be a 
certain time after starting business. Bruder! and Schussler suggest that the duration of 
adolescence depends on the initial stock of the company that helps it survive, and the 
persistence of the entrepreneur in continuing to operate with a lack of sufficient 
information concerning performance. Once the initial stock of resources has depleted and 
the entrepreneur has received accurate information concerning poor performance, then the 
company will fail and the period of adolescence is said to be over (Bruder! & Schussler, 
1990). BrUder! and SchUssler empirically tested, and found strong support for this theory. 
2.4 Internal Causes of Failure 
There have been a number of studies that investigate the causes of new company failure. 
The lists of causes are almost as numerous as the studies themselves, as shown in Table 
2.3. Although the exact causes of new company failure in New Zealand are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the studies mentioned are helpful when a researcher is attempting to 
identify the possible reasons for regional variations. 
~~7::~< ~-O~;:::-: -:: ~_~ 
f:~:;';=:-':<-=-:~-'::'--:'-;' 
.~'.< - ~ ~ .. -
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Table 2.3 Endogenous causes of company failure !-. -!-:·-,-----·-·7-:--~:-_: 
Main Area Elements Supporting Authors 
Accounting 
Credit management Heilman, 1935 
Williams, 1975 
Abdelsamd, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
Said & Hughet, 1977 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Wood,1978 
Larson & Clute, 1979 
McKinlay, 1979 
Hunter, 1980 
Turner, 1984 
Accounts payable Williams, 1975 
Abdelsamad, De Genero & Wood, 1977 
Larson & Clute, 1979 
McKinlay, 1979 
Inventory control Williams, 1975 
Said & Hughet, 1977 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Wood,1978 
Larson & Clute, 1979 
McKinlay, 1979 
Todd, 1979 
Turner, 1984 
---
Administration of fixed assets Dun and Bradstreet, 1978 
Wood,1978 
Burr & Heckman, 1979 
McKinlay, 1979 
Turner, 1984 
Cashflow analysis and liquidity Biggs, 1971 
Thompson, 1976 
Abdelsamad, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
McKinlay, 1979 
Hunter, 1980 
Turner, 1984 
Budgeting for business growth Thompson, 1976 
Abdelsamad, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
Inadequate or no accounting records Woodruff & Alexandra, 1958 
Biggs, 1971 
Abdelsamad, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
Larson & Clute, 1979 
Todd, 1979 
Hunter, 1980 
Marketing Inadequate sales Woodruff & Alexandra, 1958 
Biggs, 1971 
Marketing deficiencies 
Location 
Finance Lack of initial capital 
General financing 
Overgearing or excessive liabilities 
General Competitive weakness 
Operating problems 
Excessive drawings 
Lack of management & financial advice 
Lack of management experience 
Personal problems 
Absence or, inadequacy of a board 
of directors function 
Williams, 1975 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Smallbone, 1990 
Abdelsamad & Kindling, 1978 
Wood,1978 
Todd, 1979 
Patterson & McCullough, 1980 
Heilman, 1935 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Burr & Heckman, 1979 
Larson & Clute, 1979 
Todd, 1979 
Heilman, 1935 
Hartigan, 1976 
Abdelsamad, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
Abdelsamad & Kindling, 1978 
Hunter, 1980 
Adams & Kiel, 1981 
Burr & Heckman, 1979 
Abdelsamad, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
Hunter, 1980 
Adams & Kiel, 1981 
Sheppard, 1994 
Moulton, Thomas & Pruett, 1996 
Dun & Bradstreet;-1978 
Hunter, 1980 
Abdelsamad, De Genaro & Wood, 1977 
Abedelsamad & Kindling, 1978 
Hunter, 1980 
Abdelsamad & Kindling, 1978 
Hunter, 1980 
Thompson, 1976 
Wood, 1978 
Litvak & Maule, 1980 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Abdelsamad & Kindling, 1978 
McKinlay, 1979 
Chaganti, Mahajan & Sharma, 1985 
Daily & Dalton, 1994 
Gales & Kesner, 1994 
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2.5 External causes of company failure 
t':-:,':7,-"";-;:'-;: 
! 
There are a number of studies that investigate external causes of company failure. Because 
they are external factors, they are largely beyond the direct control of management. See 
Table 2.4 for a listing. 
Table 2.4 Exogenous causes of company failure 
Element Supporting Author(s) 
Economic conditions 
Paustian & Lewis, 1963 
Hartigan, 1976 
Abdelsamad & Kindling, 1978 
Hunter, 1980 
Carroll & Delacroix, 1982 
Freeman, 1982 
Stewart & Gallagher, 1985 
Small bone, 1990 
Robson, 1996 
Seasonal conditions 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Fraud 
Biggs, 1971 
Hartigan, 1976 
Dun & Bradstreet, 1978 
Rate of technology change 
Epstein, 1927 
Berryman, 1983 
Audretsch, 1991 
Market stability 
Epstein, 1927 
Cover, 1933 
Heilman, 1935 
McKean, 1958 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977 
Whetten, 1980 
Carroll & Delacroix, 1982 
Freeman, 1982 
Freeman & Hannan, 1983 
Zammuto & Cameron, 1985 
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The ability of management to adapt the company's structure in order to capitalise 
on opportunities created by the environment, as well as to buffer against disturbances, is 
largely constrained by the level of structural inertia within that company (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). 
Both internal structural arrangements and external pressures determine the level of 
structural inertia within a company. Internal structural arrangements include: investment in 
specialised assets, information received, internal politics and the history of the company. 
External pressures relate to legal and fiscal barriers to entry, external constraints on 
information, legitimacy constraints and collective rationality problems in obtaining a fo. . ...... : 
general equilibrium (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). It is this level of inertia that determines 
the role, or degree of influence that the environment has in the failure of a company 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Freeman, 1982; Freeman & Hannan, 1983; Zammuto & 
Cameron, 1985). 
2.6 General versus Specific Environment 
A number of authors suggest that companies are affected by two environments: a general 
environment tied to the national or global economy (comprising unemployment, gross 
domestic product, deregulation, political business cycle and money supply etc), and a 
specific environment that is tied to individual regions and their economies (Hall, 1972; 
Kimberly, 1979). Either one of these environments can influence the failure of a company. 
In a study conducted by Lane and Schary (1991) new company failure rates were 
investigated within nine American states. The researchers found that there were 
considerable differences in the rates of failure. The primary explanation for this difference 
was that" ... either a change in the mix of industries in certain regions or an improvement in 
certain regions' economic infrastructure caused the decline in the failure rate in those 
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regions" (Lane & Schary, 1991). This explanation is consistent with Hutchinson, 
Hutchinson & Newcomer (1938) who stated that regional differences might occur due to 
"The size of the community and specific local conditions ... ". 
Buss (1990) also investigated regional differences in rural business failure rates. He 
analysed the rural failure rates of businesses in three different American states. The study 
suggests that regional differences can be largely attributed to the industry mix of the area 
(Buss, 1990). When discussing regional variations of company failure in New Zealand, 
Skillen (1989) suggests that: 
there may be occasions when regional patterns of company formation/cessation differ 
significantly from national rates. For example, company formation (and failure) in Otago 
during the goldrushes of the 1860s might be presumed to be different from those in 
Auckland during the same period and from those in Christchurch ... 
Likewise, Turner (1984), who focused his study of company failure rates on the 
Otago region, suggested that replication of the study in other regional areas of New· 
Zealand would be useful in the examination of variations between geographic locations. 
Unfortunately, no empirical studies of this nature have been conducted to date in New 
Zealand. 
2.7 Area Profiles of Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch 
2.7.1 PopUlation 
The first important research factor, when developing a regional profile is population. Table 
2.5 presents the regional population figures for the three main centres compiled from 
Statistics New Zealand Census information. 
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Table 2.5 Regional population based on Census statistics 
Year Auckland Wellington Christchurch 
1986 821,733 325,713 300,053 
1991 885,571 325,685 307,179 
1996 997,940 335,468 331,443 
.. 
(Compiled of Statistics New Zealand- Census Information 1986, 1991 & 1996) 
Table 2.5 and Figure 2.1 show clearly that Auckland is the largest city in New 
Zealand in terms of residents. They also show that Auckland is New Zealand's fastest 
growing city. Because Auckland has a larger population and therefore a greater potential 
business market, in comparison with Wellington and Christchurch this has positive 
implications for entrepreneurs and the success of their business. However, in such an 
environment competition may be more intense. To examine this, the total regional 
population was divided by the total number of businesses for the two census years 1991 
and 1996. In 1991, for every 14.3 residents, Auckland had one business while Wellington 
and Christchurch both had slightly more competition with one business per 13.7 residents. 
In 1996 all three centres experienced increased competition, Auckland had one business 
per 11.3 residents, Wellington had one business per 10.8 residents and Christchurch one 
business per 10.6 residents (Calculated from Census Information & Business Activity 
Statistics, Statistics New Zealand, 1991 & 1996). The research concludes that Auckland 
during the period studied had a greater potential business market, and less business 
competition, than did Wellington and Christchurch. 
Figure 2.1 
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2.7.2 A verage Weekly Wage 
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Income levels are also an important factor to research when assessment is being made on 
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the potential market of a region. Within the local economy the level of weekly earnings and 
annual income of the population has a considerable impact on the local business 
community because they directly influence that population's level of disposable income. 
The level of disposable income affects the propensity of a population to spend and hence 
alters the level of aggregate demand for a business's product (McTaggart, Findlay & 
Parkin, 1992). A lower level of aggregate demand for goods and services reduces the 
market niche size and hence the carrying capacity of the market (Zammuto & Cameron, 
1985). As the carrying capacity of the market decreases the competition between 
businesses increases as they try to obtain available resources (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). 
Those businesses that fail to adapt are naturally selected out which results in high rates of 
business failure (Jovanovic, 1982). 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates clearly that the population of Wellington has a higher 
average weekly wage than both Auckland and Christchurch. What is also shown is that the 
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average weekly wage in Christchurch is significantly below the New Zealand national 
average. This research would suggest that the local economy in Christchurch is weak in 
comparison with Auckland and Wellington for the period studied. It should be noted, 
however, that there are two universities within the Canterbury area. This results in a high 
concentration of students who usually have a lower than average income. Because of this 
population composition, the low average income in Christchurch may not be a true 
reflection of the average spending power of the permanent residents. 
Figure 2.2 Average Weekly Income 
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2.7.3 Consumer Price Index (all groups) and Average House Prices 
The CPI (Consumer Price Index) and average house price were examined in order to 
determine differences in the cost of living between the regions. The researcher concluded 
that there is a significant difference in cost of living between regions, which might account 
for the subsequent variations in average weekly income. These measures, the CPI and 
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average house price, were examined because they constitute a large portion of household 
spending. Home ownership, or rent, reflected 21 percent of household expenditure between 
1989 and 1990; and 19.9 percent of household expenditure between 1991 and 1992 (New 
Zealand Official Yearbook, 1990 & 1992). 
Figure 2.3 A verage house prices 
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The graph in Figure 2.3 shows that the average house price in Auckland is higher 
than that of Wellington and Christchurch. The Auckland average house price is also 
increasing at a faster rate than prices in the other two centres. This trend is consistent with, 
and can ultimately be explained by, Auckland's population explosion. Although the 
average house price in Wellington is lower than Auckland, but higher than in Christchurch, 
Wellington's ranking, as the highest average weekly wage region would suggest it had a 
healthy economy. What is less clear is whether Auckland's higher average wage, in 
comparison with Christchurch, is neutralised by the higher average price of housing 
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($63;160 more per home in Auckland than Christchurch in 1991). This issue was amplified 
in 1996 with the average house price in Auckland being $161,650 more than average house 
prices in Christchurch. 
The CPI measures the relati ve increases of the price of a basket of goods that 
account for a high proportion of a household's expenditure, in a certain area over a period 
of time (McTaggart, Findlay & Parkin, 1992). A base year is used (1993 in this study), and 
the measure is simply the ratio of this, or a particular period's, value of the goods compared 
with the base period's value for each region, multiplied by 100 (McTaggart, Findlay & 
Parkin, 1992). 
Figure 2.4 
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It is important to note that the CPI measures the relative increase of prices in a 
certain area over time, but does not illustrate the actual cost of living. Figure 2.4, shows 
that there is little difference in the rate of increase in the price of goods during the period 
28 
1987 to 1998. The noticeable difference is that Auckland's relatively rapid increase in the I ~<_ c_ ~.~.~->~.-.'- "'-~'.'- ~ 
r~;;:;;:;:~~c 
price of goods started in 1995. Research based on Figure 2.4 concludes that few inferences 
can be drawn from the CPI concerning the health of the economy. Research found that, 
unfortunately, accurate and reliable information on the relative costs of living is not 
available for the three cities Auckland, Wellington· and Christchurch during the period 
studied. 
2.7.4 Unemployment 
Research suggests that the rate of unemployment is an important indicator of economic 
health and directly affects the level of aggregate demand for goods and services 
(McTaggart, Findlay & Parkin, 1992). If the rate of unemployment in a region is high, then 
generally the aggregate demand for goods and services will be low. Conversely, if the level 
of unemployment is low, the demand for goods and services will be higher. 
Table 2.6 Regional rates of unemployment 
>--
r:.· r------- -
Census year 1991 1996 Region 
10.6% 8.4% Auckland 
9.1% 5.8% Wellington 
9.9% 10.1% Christchurch 
10.6% 7.7% New Zealand 
(Compiled of information obtained from Statistics New Zealand - Census Information 1991 & 1996) 
Table 2.6 demonstrates, in census year 1991, a slight difference in unemployment rates 
among the three centres Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, and all the rates are 
similar to the New Zealand national average. For the year 1996, Table 2.6 shows evidence 
that the unemployment rate in Wellington improved dramatically as did the rate in 
Auckland although it was to a lesser extent. Table 2.6 demonstrates that from census year 
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1991 Christchurch experienced a minimal increase in its rate of unemployment, taking the 
region above the national average. 
The unemployment figures in Table 2.6 also correspond with the average regional 
weekly wage figures for the same period 1991-1996. This data ranks Wellington as the 
healthiest regional economy, compared with Auckland which ranked second and 
Christchurch third. This regional data would indicate that during the period, 1991-1996, 
Wellington provided the most favourable economic environment compared with Auckland 
and Christchurch, in which to start or maintain a company. It is therefore reasonable for the 
researcher to presume that the failure rate of companies during this period was lower in 
Wellington than in Auckland and Christchurch. 
2.7.5 Industry Mix 
The final factor that this study addresses is the industry mix of businesses within each of 
_ .. 
the three regions: Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. Section 2.2 has discussed the 
different rates of business failure for the different types of industries within the regions. 
Fredland and Morris (1976) suggest that the different rates of business failure for different 
r········,··-:·,········· 
types of industry may be principally due to the operating environments specific to 
individual industries. These environments may result in industries having differing barriers 
to entry in terms of: initial amounts of capital required, economies of scale, competition 
and level of technology. 
Audretsch (1991) suggests that economies of scale and capital intensity affect the 
ability of a business to survive. Audretsch also suggests that "presumably those potential 
entrants who actually do establish a new firm would be expected to be influenced by their 
prospects of survival". Lower barriers of entry (low amount of initial capital required and 
the lack of significant economies of scale) result in an increased number of entrants into a 
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particular industry (Hutchinson et aI., 1938). Zammuto and Cameron (1985) suggest that 
each niche, or market, has only a certain carrying capacity before becoming saturated. This 
saturation intensifies the competition within particular industries (retail, restaurant and 
other services) as new entrants compete for available resources. Intense competition such 
as this results in a process of natural selection of businesses as they fail to adapt and so 
results in a high inci~ence of business failure (Jonvanovic, 1982). 
Table 2.7 Industry mix: percentage oftotal business activity (1991) 
Auckland Wellington Christchurch 
Agricultural services, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing 1.5% 1.5% 2.7% 
Mining & Quarrying 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 
Manufacturing 12.3% 8.2% 11.8% 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 
Construction 15.3% 15% 12.9% 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants & Hotels 27.5% 27.7% 32.9% 
Transport, Storage & Communication 7.3% 7.3% 6.4% 
Business & Financial services 21.2% 22.7% 14.4% 
Community, Social & Personal services 14.7% 17% 18.4% 
(Compiled of data obtained from Statistics New Zealand - Business Activity, 1991) 
Table 2.7 shows that wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels constitute the largest 
percentage of business activity based on total number of business units in all of the three 
centres. Business and financial services rate as the second largest, while community, social 
and personal services rate as the third largest business activity. This pattern of business 
activity is consistent with the researcher's previous theory that low barrier industries such 
as retail, restaurants, hotels and business services, (low capital requirement and economies 
of scale) will experience the most new entrants. It is reasonable to presume that retail, 
restaurants, hotels and business services require less capital than mining, manufacturing or 
water and gas facilities, and that economies of scale are less important. 
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The three cities in Table 2.7 have very similar industry mixes. Christchurch, _. -,~~.:-:::-::,:-~.:-~,,:--:..-:, 
however, has proportionately more agricultural services, forestry, hunting and fishing than 
Wellington and Auckland. This is because Christchurch is the main business centre within 
a large agricultural area that spans much of the South Island of New Zealand. 
In Table 2.8 the industry mix data for 1996, is segmented further into seventeen 
different categories. ,The pattern of business activity remains the same as in Table 2.7 with 
the largest share constituted in the property and business services, followed by retailing 
which rates as the second largest share of activity based on total business units. These are 
industries that traditionally have relatively low barriers to entry, that is, a low level of 
capital required and lesser economies of scale. 
Table 2.8 Industry mix: percentage of total business activity (1996) 
Auckland Wellington Christchurch 
Agricultural services, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing 0.7% 1.4% 2.7% 
Mining & Quarrying 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Manufacturing 9.4% 6.5% 9.7% 
'. . ._- . 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 
1·.:-·_-•• ·.·.·'-.-·-
Construction 12.9% 11.5% 12.1% 
Wholesale Trade 9.0% 6% 8.2% 
Retail 13.0% 13.3% 15.5% 
Accommodation, Cafe & Restaurant 2.2% 2.9% 3.6% 
Transport & Storage 4.5% 4.4% 4.5% 
Communication 1.3% 1.6% 1.3% 
Finance & Insurance 4.7% 7.6% 3.6% 
Property & Business service 30% 28.8% 24.2% ':.:-: ; ~'~" <> . -:-~ ;-" 
Government administration & Defence 0.4% 1.3% 1% 
Education 1.9% 2.8% 2.7% 
Health & Community services 4.1% 4.5% 5% 
Cultural & Recreational services 2.4% 2.8% 2.1% 
Personal & Other services 3.3% 4.2% 3.5% 
.. 
(CompIled of data obtamed from Statistics New Zealand- Busmess Activity, 1996) 
The three centres in Table 2.8 share similar industry mixes to those in Table 2.7. 
Christchurch has a slight variation in results because of its relatively high level of 
agricultural, forestry, hunting and fishing services compared with Auckland and 
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Wellington. Wellington shows a slight variation in results compared to Auckland and 
Christchurch as it has a relatively high level of finance and insurance business activity. 
When the findings in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are examined, retail, property, business and 
related services are shown to experience higher levels of competition. In the literature these 
industries are also shown to suffer from relatively high business failure rates (Heilman, 
1935; Hutchinson et aI., 1938; Black, 1946; Churchill, 1955; Etcheson, 1962; Phillips & 
Kirchoff, 1989; Reynolds, 1987). 
2.8 Research questions 
The first research question this study investigates is: 
1) What is the failure rate of new companies in New Zealand, using the base year of 1987 
and following progress over an II-year period? 
In order for the researcher to develop hypotheses, it is helpful to r~~ap on the literature 
reviewed previously. First, the measure of company failure is of particular importance, as it 
ultimately determines the observed rate of failure. The measures used in this study by the 
researcher are discontinuance for any reason, and liquidation (voluntary or involuntary). 
Considering the liability of newness as proposed by Stinchcombe (1965), the researcher has 
: . : -.-. --" .-~'>---~. 
theorised that the highest rates of new company failure occur mainly in the early years of a .... '.', ... 
business's operation. This probability is compounded by the liability of smallness concept 
(see Section 2.3.2) in that most new businesses are presumed to be relatively small 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Therefore, the researcher hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 1: New company failure rates will be higher in the early years 
of operation regardless of the region. 
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The second and main research question this study explores is: 
2) Is there any regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch for the period studied? 
Hall (1972) and Kimberly (1979) suggest that there are general environments such as the 
national economy, and specific environments such as the regional economy that affect the 
rate of business failure within a country. Skillen (1989) suggests that "there may be 
occasions when regional patterns of company formation/cessation differ significantly" due 
to the national and regional economic environments. Lane and Schary (1991) and Buss 
(1990) from their research found that there were regional variations in reported rates of 
new business failure. The researcher therefore hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 2: The rate of new company failure will vary between New 
Zealand's three main centres (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch) for 
the period studied. 
When average weekly income rates are compared see Figure 2.2, the population of 
Wellington receives a higher average wage than those in Auckland and higher still than the 
population in Christchurch (Statistics New Zealand, 1991 & 1996). For the same period of 
time (1991-1996) average house prices in Wellington, when compared, were lower than 
Auckland but higher than Christchurch. The researcher believes, that although 
Christchurch has lower house prices, the benefits of these prices are outweighed by the 
higher levels of weekly income in Wellington. The higher levels of income in the 
Wellington area, along with relatively low levels of unemployment, result in a reasonably 
stable demand for goods and services. The stable level of demand for goods and services 
results in an increase in market niche size and the economic carrying capacity of the market 
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place, which according to the research, means less business competition, less natural 
selection and ultimately fewer business failures. However, this type of environmentcan 
result in an increase in new business entrants who are attracted by the prospects of higher 
profits achievable in a more lucrative economy. All three centres Auckland, Wellington 
and Christchurch experienced an increase in business competition from 1991 to 1996, with 
the number of residents (in each city) per business dropping in Auckland from 14.3 people 
in 1991 to 11.3 people in 1996; Wellington in 1991 from 13.7 to 10.8 in 1996; 
Christchurch from 13.7 in 1991 to 10.6 in 1996 (Statistics New Zealand, 1991 & 1996). 
Although these results show, (during the period 1991 to 1996) a trend towards more 
competition in the market place, which is significant over time, they do not show any major 
difference in the rate of industry competition among the three main centres Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch as at 1996. Therefore, it is hypothesised by the researcher 
based on the results of business and economic activity during the study period among the 
three main centres Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch that: 
Hypothesis 3: Wellington will have had a lower new company failure rate 
than Auckland and Christchurch during the period studied. 
The researcher concludes based on the same research results above that although 
Auckland has a higher rate of weekly income its higher house prices remove any obvious 
economic advantage over Christchurch that has a lower average weekly income. 
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. This economic argument, although not as strong as the argument used for Wellington, has 
lead the researcher to hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 4: Christchurch will have had a lower new company failure rate 
than Auckland, but higher new company failure rate than Wellington during 
the period studied. 
The third and final question addressed in this study concerns the explanatory power within 
a region of the independent economic and social variables (population, rates of 
unemployment, average weekly wage, average house price and Consumer Price Index). 
That is: What are the determinants of regional variation in new company failure rates 
between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch? No a priori hypotheses are proposed 
concerning this research question. 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
An accurate, objective and universal measure of company failure has eluded researchers in 
the past. Different measures of company failure and the frequent use of data that has been 
obtained from databases compiled for many different and various purposes has led to 
general misconceptions about the rates of new company failure. The measures used by the 
researcher in this study include: discontinuance for any reason and liquidation (whether 
voluntary or involuntary). 
Many factors affect the level of new company failure not only on a regional, but 
also on a national level. These factors include: individual industry characteristics; 
liabilities of Newness, Smallness and Adolescence; internal factors (such as company 
structure and the level of skilled personnel); and external factors (such as the national 
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economy) in both general and specific business environments. It is therefore difficult for ,--< :.:--:-:--::.. " 
I;C;~)~~~;. 
the researcher, and well beyond the scope of this thesis, to ascertain all the causes that 
contribute to rates of new company failure. This study, instead, focuses on the importance 
of specific environmental factors (population, unemployment, average weekly wage, 
average house price and Consumer Price Index) in order to explain regional variations, if 
any, in new compan~ failure rates. 
Research questions and hypotheses proposed by the researcher for this study are 
based on the literature presented in this chapter and from suggestions by Skillen (1989) and 
Turner (1984) in their research which concerned the possibility of regional variations in 
company failure rates. The study attempts to ascertain what the new company failure rate is 
in New Zealand by using two measures: discontinuance for any reason and liquidation 
(voluntary or involuntary). By identifying what the new company failure rate is, the 
researcher addresses the main focus of this study, attempting to identify any regional 
variations in new company failure rates, and the extent of variation between New Zealand's 
~ -~ 
three main centres (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch). The study will also 
investigate the effect, if any, that the specific environment has on the reported variation in 
new company failure rates. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
The method of analysis used in this study of new company failure rates was survival 
analysis. Survival analysis consists of a process that measures the duration of time until a 
specified event occurs, in this case from the establishment of a business until that business 
fails (SAS Users Guide, 1990). This method of analysis was chosen for a number of 
reasons, including the fact that new business failure is often time-varying, seldom normally 
distributed, and is affected by censoring (event does not occur before the end of the 
measurement window) (Melnyk et aI., 1995). Survival analysis also allows the analysis of 
time-dependent variables, whose values change over time (Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1993). 
Chapter Three begins by describing the sample, specifically the popUlation of 
1'--:.:':::':: :: 
companies who registered in 1987 with the Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch New 
Zealand Ministry of Commerce Companies Offices. Section 3.3 briefly discusses the 
measures of company failure used in this study (discontinuance for any reason and 
liquidation). Section 3.4 highlights some important factors associated with the Companies 
Office database. Section 3.5 outlines in detail the procedure that is followed in the study. 
Survival analysis is introduced in Section 3.6, with a brief explanation provided as to why 
its use is applicable in the setting of this study. Section 3.7 shows the statistical equations 
used to measure new company failure rates, and introduces the computer software used to 
analyse the data collected. Finally, Section 3.8 provides a summary of material covered in 
this chapter. 
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3.2 Sample 
For the purposes of this research the sample data consists of 8867 companies that started 
business, or first registered, as a company with the New Zealand Ministry of Commerce in 
1987. The sample within this study is made up of the total registrations of the Auckland 
office (5413 companies), Christchurch office (1235 companies) and the Wellington office 
(2219 companies). The sample does not include sole traders or partnerships, because these 
business types are not required by law to register on the Companies Office database. 
The base year of 1987 was selected for this study because of the need of a 
reasonable time frame. Numerous studies have found that the majority of business failures 
occur within 10 years of their establishment (Hutchinson et aI., 1938; Churchill, 1952; Star 
& Massel, 1981; Ganguly, 1985; Phillips & Kirchoff, 1989; Lowe, McKenna & Tibbits, 
1991; Williams, 1993). Therefore, a lO-year-old company, which should be well 
established, has a similar probability of failure as a 70-year-old company. 
3.3 ~easures 
In Chapter Two, it was concluded that the measure used in research when studying 
company failure rates is very important. This is because it will ultimately determine the 
findings and conclusions of the study (Scott & Lewis, 1984). The measures used in this 
study differ in their scope, and therefore the results also differ. The first measure used is 
discontinuance for any reason. This measure has in research been the most commonly used 
(see Table 2.1 Chapter Two). The measure is very broad and it measures more 
appropriately company survival, rather than company failure. Fredland and Morris (1976), 
however, raise an interesting argument which suggests that economic failure should also 
include any company that is earning a rate of return on investment that is less than the 
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company's opportunity cost. Fredland and Morris then go on to suggest that the proxy for 
i::~~::/J:~~:~::· 
, 
this is business turnover, as "turnover suggests the shifting of resources to more profitable 
opportunities". Therefore, the measure discontinuancefor any reason has been included in 
this study as a valid measure. 
This study also uses the second measure of liquidation. This measure is narrow and 
includes all companies that have gone into liquidation. Skillen (1989) suggests this can be 
voluntary liquidation by shareholders, in which case a declaration of solvency is filed and a 
liquidator is appointed or it can be involuntary in which case creditors appeal to the court 
for action against the company. This measure of business failure has been used in a number 
of studies including Wilcox, 1973; Blum, 1974; Elam, 1975; Argenti, 1976; and Skillen, 
1989. 
The researcher hopes that using two measures will satisfy readers seeking either 
discontinuance for any reason or liquidation as measures of company failure. The 
interpretation of the results in this study is therefore subject to the reader's own definition 
-"--
of failure. It is the opinion of the researcher that the true company failure rate will lie 
somewhere in between these two extremes. 
3.4 Database Information 
In New Zealand all entities with the legal form of company (that is with limited liabilities) 
are required by law to register on the companies register, which is held by the Companies 
Office, New Zealand Ministry of Commerce. The Companies Office has offices in six 
major centres including Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. 
The researcher believes that the reader should note a company is not legally obliged 
to operate in the geographical area in which it has registered. This can create problems in 
research when a comparison of companies between geographical areas is attempted. 
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However, a Companies Office contact stated that "this is more of an exception than a rule" 
F. McDonald (personal communication, August 1998). On investigation it was found that 
identification of the exact location of a company's operation was virtually impossible. 
Therefore, the researcher presumes that if a company is registered with a certain office, 
then it operates within that geographical region and is affected by the local economic 
climate. Any deviati(;ms from this presumption are likely to be experienced equally by the 
three regions. 
3.5 Research Procedure 
For this study the researcher obtained the complete population of companies newly 
registered in 1987 from the Companies Office database in Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch. The researcher tracked the progress of these companies over an II-year 
period from 1987 to 1998. Where the database indicated that a particular company had 
gone into liquidation, the date of liquidation was recorded. Likewise, the researcher 
recorded the date that a particular company was struck-off the Companies Office register 
regardless of reason. The researcher believes that the reader should note a company could 
be in the status liquidation for a long time before being struck-off the register. Because of 
this a company could have failed based on the measure liquidation without being indicated 
to have failed based on the alternative measure discontinuance for any reason. 
The researcher obtained regional statistical information concerning the independent 
variables (Consumer Price Index, unemployment rate, average weekly wage and 
population) from Statistics New Zealand publications, PC Infos and by personal 
communication with J. Upfold (Statistics New Zealand). Information concerning average 
regional house price was obtained through personal communication with G. Andrews 
(Valuation New Zealand). 
::,:.::-;:,:~-~ 
The data was then analysed using the survival analysis techniques as described in 
the following section. Life tables, survival and hazard curves, tests for equality and Cox 
regression were used to compare and contrast geographical areas. Based on these results 
the three main research questions listed in Section 2.8 were answered. 
3.6 Survival Analysis 
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Survival data consists of a certain response that measures the duration of time until a 
specified event occurs (failure), and a set of independent variables thought to be associated 
with the event-time variable (SAS User's Guide, 1990). 
hnportant Elements of Survival Analysis: 
1) Censoring: Because the 'event' may not have occurred by the end of the study period, 
the data collected may need to be censored. This is called Type 1 censoring or right 
censoring (Lagakos, 1980). Type 2 censoring involves data thafwhen entered into the 
study does not coincide with exposure to risk variables. This data is said to be "left 
truncated" (Marubini & Valsecchi, 1995). 
2) The Importance of Timing and Probability of Failure: Melnyk et al. (1995) suggest that 
analyses of events is a difficult task as "events are often time-varying (where the 
probability of the event (failure) taking place changes over the life of the event), are 
seldom normally distributedand are affected by censoring". Survival analysis provides a 
solution to these problems. 
It is widely accepted by researchers that the probability of business failure changes with 
the passage of time; the probability of failure is higher in the first five years of operation 
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(Converse, 1932; Vaile, 1932; Hutchinson et al. 1938; McGarry, 1939; Star & Steiner, 
1939; Hicks & Crowder, 1943; McGarry, 1947; Churchill, 1955; Brady & Montgomery, 
1959; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983). Because not only the 
probability of failure, but the timing of such is of interest, survival analysis is ideal as "it 
allows us to incorporate time as an important variable" (Morita, Lee & Mowday, 1993). 
3) Time-dependent Predictors: An important feature of survival analysis is that it has the 
flexibility to allow for time-dependent predictors, the values of which change over time 
(Morita, Lee & Mowday, 1993). The time-dependent variables in this case are the levels 
of Consumer Price Index, unemployment, average weekly wage, average house price 
and population for New Zealand's three main centres (Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch). The dynamic nature of such variables render both logistic and OLS 
regression inadequate as these techniques only use information based on the beginning 
and the end of the measurement window (Morita, Lee & Mowday, 1993). 
3.7 Analysis Measures and Statistical Software 
3.7.1 Life tables 
Life Tables are used to subdivide the period of observation (1987-1998) into smaller 
intervals of years. For each interval, all the companies who have survived at least that long 
will be used to calculate the probability of a terminal event (company failure) occurring in 
that interval. The probabilities are then used to estimate the overall probability of company 
failure at different time points (SPSS Manual, 1997). 
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3.7.2 The test for equality using the log-rank, Breslow and Tarone-Ware tests 
The SPSS Kaplan-Meier procedure provides three statistical tests that will be used to test 
for variations between the three groups of data. These tests include the log-rank (or Mantel-
Cox), the Breslow (or generalised Wilcoxon) and the Tarone-Ware test. The tests compare 
the number of terminal events (company failures) actually observed (Di) with the number 
of expected terminal events (Ei). Expected terminal events are calculated from the number 
at risk and the number of deaths at each time interval in the study (SPSS Manual, 1997). 
The sum of the resulting differences is then calculated as shown in equation 1. 
k 
V = L wi(Di - Ei) (1) 
i=1 
The difference between the three tests is the w, or weight factor (SPSS Manual, 
1997). The log-rank test has a w factor of 1 (all events are weighted equally). In the 
Breslow test the weight factor is the number at risk at each point in time. Therefore early 
events are weighted more heavily than later events as the number of companies in the risk 
pool decreases as events occur over time. The w factor for the Tarone-Ware test is the 
square root of the number of companies at risk, so it weights early cases somewhat less 
heavily (SPSS Manual, 1997). 
The log-rank test is a more powerful measure than the Breslow test under the 
following condition: that the mortality rate of companies in each group being compared, is 
proportional to that of the others (ie they differ by a constant multiplier) (SPSS Manual, 
1997). If this condition is not in place as in this study, the Breslow test then becomes a 
more powerful measure, although the test has very little power when there is a large 
percentage of censored cases (SPSS Manual, 1997). 
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3.7.3 The Survival and Hazard Curves using the Kaplan-Meier estimate , -. ---= -- .-.;-~ 1-'. -" •. ~'_-_'::'~~:.,~:..:'~:-::'.:-, 
~~:;~~~~~i~~ 
I 
I 
The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor and hazard functions and the median survival 
time is calculated by the SPSS procedure "km". The Kaplan-Meier estimate is a 
modification of the survivor function estimate that allows the use of partial information 
obtained from right censored data (Kaplan & Meier, 1958). 
The survivor function is the probability that an individual company will survive 
from the time of origin (1987) to some time beyond t (Collet, 1994). The survival time of a 
company, t, can be regarded as the value of a variable T. The different values that T can 
take have a probability distribution, and T is called the random variable associated with 
the survival time (Collet, 1994). 
Suppose that T has a probability distribution with underlying probability density 
function f(t). The distribution function of T is shown in equation 2. 
I --«-:.-.- --
F(t)=P(T<t)= f f(v)dv (2) 
() 
This equation represents the probability that the survival time of an individual company is 
less than some value t. The survivor function Set) is the probability that the survival time is 
greater than, or equal to t, and is expressed in equation 3. 
S(t) = p(r 2. t) = 1- F(t) (3) 
The hazard function is the probability that a company fails at time t, conditional on the 
company surviving to that time (Collet, 1994). The random variable associated with a 
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company's survival time, T, lying between t and t + Ot, conditional on T being greater than 
or equal to t, is written pet ~ T < t + Ot I T ~ t) (Collet, 1994). The hazard function h(t) (see 
equation 4) is then the limiting value of this probability divided by the time interval Ot, as 
Ot tends to zero (Collet, 1994). 
h{t) = lim{P{t ~ T < t + miT ~ t)} (4) 
OHO ot 
3.7.4 Cox regression with time-dependent covariates 
The Cox regression with time-dependent covariates model is used if the proportional 
hazards assumption does not hold (hazard ratios change across time), and the values of the 
covariates being studied are different at different time points. The Cox regression model is 
used in this study to allow for the changing values of various macro economic and social 
variables, and to evaluate the contribution of these variables to regional variations in new 
company failure rates. The model is represented as: 
h(t) = ho(t) exp[BIXI (t) + B2X2 (t) + B3X3 (t) + B4X4 (t) + BsXs (t)] (5) 
XI= Level of unemployment 
X2= Population 
X3= Average house price 
X4= Average weekly wage 
X5= Consumer Price Index 
Bi= The estimated value of the ith covariate's coefficient. 
The subscript (t) indicates that the covariate is time-dependent, which means that the value 
changes within the measurement window (Morita, Lee & Mowday, 1993). As the value of 
Xi changes, so to does the multiplicative factor on the right-hand side of equation 5. 
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Therefore, two individual companies may share a value on a time-dependent covariate up 
to time t, but when their values diverge, their estimated hazard functions will also diverge 
(Morita, Lee & Mowday, 1993). A correlation table is constructed to investigate the 
presence of multicollinarity between the five independent variables. Based on these 
. findings the best combination of variables will be examined. 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the methodological approach that was used to ascertain: the new 
company failure rate in New Zealand, the presence of regional variation in new company 
failure rates and the degree of variation in failure rates between New Zealand's three main 
centres (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch). The chapter also explains how survival 
analysis techniques have been used to ascertain the explanatory power of local economic 
and social variables in determining regional variations in company failure rates. Also 
outlined in this chapter are the: characteristics of the study's sample population, measures 
of company failure, information concerning the Companies Office database, the procedure 
undertaken to analyse the data, survival analysis techniques and their applicability to this 
study and the statistical equations and software that will be used in the analysis. 
l-_'_'-' 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results 
4.1 Overview 
The results of this study are reported in three main sections. Section One contains the 
results of the first research question presented in Chapter Two: What is the new company 
failure rate in New Zealand for the period studied? This section contains life tables and 
survival and hazard curves based on pooled data and employing each of the two measures: 
-. ','-~,'. 
discontinuance for any reason and liquidation. The pooled data and associated graphs are 
presented as a national sample representative of the entire country. 
Section Two contains the results of the second research question: Is there regional 
variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, Wellingion and Christchurch 
for the period studied? The life tables and survival and hazard curves for the three regions 
are presented based on the two company failure measures used in this study. Also, the 
results of the log-rank, Breslow and Tarone-Ware tests to determine the presence of 
regional variations are presented in Section Two. 
Section Three presents the results of the Cox regression with time-varying covariates. 
This test provides information relating to the third research question: What are some of the 
determinants of regional variations in new company failure rates? The test examines the 
explanatory power of a group of macro economic and social variables. These variables 
include population, unemployment, average weekly wage, average house price and 
Consumer Price Index. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of results obtained 
in this study. 
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4.2 National Rates of Company Failure 
This section addresses the first research question presented in Section 2.8: What is the 
failure rate of new companies in New Zealand for the period studied? The researcher 
investigated pooled data from New Zealand's three main urban centres (Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchruch) in terms of two measures: discontinuance for any reason 
and liquidation. From these data, the researcher constructed life tables and survival and 
hazard curves. Then, the researcher addressed the first hypothesis from Section 2.8: New 
company failure rates will be higher in the early years of operation regardless of the region. 
4.2.1 Discontinuance for any reason 
The figures in Table 4.1 and the survival and hazard plots in Figure 4.1 demonstrate that 
there was a long period of adolescence (five years) before initial company failures began. 
At that point, the hazard function showed a sharp and continuous increase as expected (see 
Figure 4.1). Likewise the survival function in Figure 4.1 illustrates a continuous decline in 
the survival rate of companies over time. 
Based on Table 4.1, 75 percent of companies registered in 1987 failed within 10 
years of operation, and 82.7 percent failed after 11 years. Therefore, under the 
discontinuance for any reason measure the average company failure rate was 7.5 percent 
per annum over 11 years. The median survival time was 7.54 years, and the mean survival 
time was 8 years. 
The columns in the life tables correspond to the following information: 
Year = The actual calendar year. 
Intrvl Start Time = The start of each interval. It extends up to, but not including, the start time of 
the next interval. 
Number Entrng this Intrvl = Number of companies surviving at the beginning of the interval. 
Number Wdrawn During Intrvl = Number of censored cases. They have not failed. 
Number Exposed to Risk = Number of companies entering the interval minus half the number 
withdrawn during the interval. This is used to account for the contribution of censored data. 
Number of Termnl Events = Number of companies that Jailed. 
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Propn Terminating = Proportion of companies that failed during the interval. This is an estimate of 
the probability that a company will fail during the interval. 
Propn Surviving = Proportion of companies that have survived to the end of the interval. 
Cumul Propn Surv at End = Estimate of the probability of surviving to the end of any specified 
interval. 
Probability Density = Estimate of the probability of failure during a particular time interval. 
Hazard Rate = Proportion of those companies that have survived up to a particular interval who are 
expected to fail in that interval. 
SE of Cumul Surviving = Estimate of the variability of the cumulative proportion surviving. 
SE of Probability Density = Estimate of the variability of the probability density. 
SE of Hazard Rate = Estimate of the variability of the hazard rate. 
i-·' 
Table 4.1 Life Table and Standard Errors based on Pooled Discontinuance Data 
Number Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of' SE of 
Start This During to Terminal Propn Propn Surv Probab Hazard Cumul Probability Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminat Surviving At End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 0 8867 0 8867 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 8867 0 8867 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1989 2 8867 0 8867 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1990 3 8867 0 8867 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1991 4 8867 0 8867 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1992 5 8867 0 8867 3171 0.3576 0.6424 0.6424 0.3576 0.4355 0.0051 0.0051 0.0075 
1993 6 5696 0 5696 984 0.1728 0.8272 0.5314 0.1110 0.1891 0.0053 0.0033 0.0060 
1994 7 4712 0 4712 512 0.1087 0.8913 0.4737 0.0577 0.1149 0.0053 0.0025 0.0051 
1995 8 4200 0 4200 1052 0.2505 0.7495 0.3550 0.1186 0.2863 0.0051 0.0034 0.0087 
1996 9 3148 0 3148 514 0.1633 0.8367 0.2971 0.0580 0.1778 0.0049 0.0025 0.0078 
1997 10 2634 0 2634 420 0.1595 0.8405 0.2497 0.0474 0.1733 0.0046 0.0023 0.0084 
1998 11 2214 1813 1307.5 401 0.3067 0.6933 0.1731 0.0766 0.3622 0.0045 0.0035 0.0178 
, 
From Table 4.1 the highest risk year was the fifth year of operation. At that point 35.8 percent of the surviving companies failed, as shown in the 
proportion-terminating column. Year 8 also had a relatively high failure rate with 25.1 percent of companies failing, and year 11 had a failure 
rate of 30.7 percent. 
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Figure 4.1 Survival and Hazard Curves for Pooled Discontinuance data 
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4.2.2 Liquidation 
The measure liquidation resulted in very different findings from those reported above. 
Table 4.2 demonstrates that the initial company failures started in year one, however, only 
very few (5 companies) failed until year four. At that point, the hazard rate increased 
steadily over time as illustrated in Figure 4.2. This is possible because a company may be 
placed into liquidation a long time before it is struck-off the register. Figures in Table 4.2 
show that 11.7 percent of companies registered in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch 
in the year 1987 failed within 10 years of operation. By the end of the II-year 
measurement window 13.3 percent failed. This results in an average annual failure rate of 
1.2 percent over the II-year period, median survival time of 11 years and a mean survival 
time of 10 years. 
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Table 4.2 Life Table and Standard Errors based on Pooled Liquidation Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During to Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probabi! Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminat Surviving at End Density Rate Surviving Density - Rate 
1987 0 8867 0 8867 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 8867 0 8867 1 0.0001 0.9999 0.9999 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
1989 2 8866 0 8866 1 0.0001 0.9999 0.9998 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
1990 3 8865 0 8865 3 0.0003 0.9997 0.9994 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
1991 4 8862 0 8862 126 0.0142 0.9858 0.9852 0.0142 0.0143 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 
1992 5 8736 0 8736 165 0.0189 0.9811 0.9666 0.0186 0.0191 0.0019 0.0014 0.0015 
1993 6 8571 0 8571 203 0.0237 0.9763 0.9437 0.0229 0.0240 0.0024 0.0016 0.0017 
1994 7 8368 0 8368 148 0.0177 0.9823 0.9270 0.0167 0.0178 0.0028 0.0014 0.0015 
1995 8 8220 0 8220 219 0.0266 0.9734 0.9023 0.0247 0.0270 0.0032 0.0016 0.0018 
1996 9 8001 0 8001 99 0.0124 0.9876 0.8912 0.0112 0.0125 0.0033 0.0011 0.0013 
1997 10 7902 0 7902 74 0.0094 0.9906 0.8828 0.0083 0.0094 0.0034 0.0010 0.0011 
1998 11 7828 7757 3949.5 71 0.0180 0.9820 0.8670 0.0159 0.0181 0.0038 0.0019 0.0022 
From Table 4.2, year 8 poses the greatest risk with 2.7 percent of companies failing. This is relatively close to the probability density, which is 
an estimate of the probability of failure (2.47 percent). Year 6 'was also a relatively high-risk year with 2.4 percent of companies actually failing 
compared with 2.29 percent estimated in the probability density column. 
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Figure 4.2 Survival and Hazard Curves for Pooled Liquidation data 
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4.2.3 Summary 
Both the discontinuance for any reason and liquidation measures demonstrate the presence 
of a liability of adolescence in which few failures occur in the initial years of operation, but 
thereafter the failure rates increase significantly. The study shows that the average 
company failure rate based on the measure discontinuance for any reason was 7.5 percent 
per annum (82.7 percent of companies registered in 1987 failed within 11 years of 
operation). The average company failure rate based on the measure liquidation was 1.2 
percent per annum (13.3 percent of companies registered in 1987 failed within 11 years of Ie .• : ..•••.. 
operation). The researcher expected these large differences in reported failure rates due to 
the concentration of the two measures. The large disparities highlight the contribution that 
the measure has to previous misconceptions concerning company failure rates. The 
findings disprove hypothesis 1 concerning the liability of newness as most failures 
occurred after at least 4-5 years of operation. However, as discussed in Section 5.4, these 
findings must be interrupted with caution as the long period of adolescence may simply be 
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an artefact of the database maintenance procedure, in which large numbers of companies 
are spasmodically removed from the register. 
4.3 Regional variations in new company failure rates 
This section addresses the second research question posed in Section 2.8: Is there any 
regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch for the period studied? The researcher segmented the pooled data used in the 
previous section into regions and analysed the data in terms of the two measures: 
discontinuance for any reason and liquidation. The researcher constructed life tables, 
survival and hazard curves based on this data. Also, the researcher used the log-rank, 
Breslow and Tarone-ware test statistics for equality to determine the level of significance 
of any variation. Based on these findings the study addressed the second hypothesis 
presented in Section 2.8: The rate of new company failure will vary between New 
Zealand's three main centres (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch) in the period 
studied. Following this the study addressed the third hypothesis: Wellington will have had 
a lower new company failure rate than Auckland and Christchurch during the period 
studied, and the fourth hypothesis: Christchurch will have had a lower new company 
failure rate than Auckland, but higher new company failure rate than Wellington during the 
period studied. 
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4.3.1 Discontinuance for any reason 
The researcher obtained the following results from Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 and Figure 4.3. 
The data reveals that, based on the measure discontinuance for any reason, 73.9 percent of 
Auckland companies registered in 1987 failed within 10 years of operation, 80 percent of 
Christchurch companies failed and 75 percent of Wellington companies failed. At the end 
of the measurement window (11 years), 81.7 percent of Auckland companies failed, 87 
percent of Christchurch companies failed and 82.6 percent of Wellington companies failed. 
The study records an average annual company failure rate of 7.4 percent for Auckland 
companies, 7.9 percent for Christchurch companies and 7.5 percent for Wellington 
companies. As discussed above, discontinuance for any reason is a relatively broad 
measure and consequently records high levels of failure (see Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). 
Figure 4.3 shows that both the survival and hazard curves are similar between regions with 
a small diversion occurring during the latter half of the measurement period. 
Figure 4.3 Survival and Hazard Curves based on Regional Discontinuance Data 
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Table 4.3 Test Statistics for Regional differences based on Discontinuance Data 
Number Number Percent 
Region Total Events Censored Censored 
Auckland 5413 4250 1163 21.49 Statistic df Significance 
Ch ristchu rch 1235 1040 195 15.79 Log Rank 14.16 2 0.0008 
Wellington 2219 1764 455 20.5 Breslow 5.69 2 0.0582 
Overall 8867 7054 1813 20.45 Tarone-Ware 8.30 2 0.0157 
The test statistic is simply the observed failure rates minus the expected failure rates under 
the null hypothesis of no group differences. The larger these values are, the greater the 
evidence against such a hypothesis. 
From Table 4.3, both the log-rank and the Tarone-Ware tests show significant 
;:7:::-:::-=:-:-::;::~~;::::3 
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variation in the reported failure rates between Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington. The j: -,: 
significance level of the Breslow test is larger than .05 and therefore suggests lower 
significance. The Breslow test, however, is tending towards significance with a level of 
.0582. The researcher infers from the test statistic for equality, that based on the measure 
discontinuance for any reason, there were small regional variations in new company 
failure rates between Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington for the period studied. The 
researcher concludes that, based on the test statistics and the levels of significance, under 
the measure discontinuance for any reason, Auckland had the best survival rate, followed 
by Wellington and Christchurch for the period studied. 
Table 4.4 Life Table and Standard Errors of Auckland Registered Companies based on Discontinuance Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During To Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probapility Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminating Surviving at End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 a 5413 a 5413 a 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 5413 a 5413 a 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1989 2 5413 0 5413 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1990 3 5413 0 5413 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1991 4 5413 0 5413 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1992 5 5413 0 5413 2031 0.3752 0.6248 0.6248 0.3752 0.4619 0.0066 0.0066 0.0100 
1993 6 3382 0 3382 475 0.1404 0.8596 0.5370 0.0878 0.1511 0.0068 0.0038 0.0069 
1994 7 2907 0 2907 259 0.0891 0.9109 0.4892 0.0478 0.0932 0.0068 0.0029 0.0058 
1995 8 2648 0 2648 693 0.2617 0.7383 0.3612 0.1280 0.3011 0.0065 0.0045 0.0113 
1996 9 1955 0 1955 303 0.1550 0.8450 0.3052 0.0560 0.1680 0.0063 0.0031 0.0096 
1997 10 1652 0 1652 239 0.1447 0.8553 0.2610 0.0442 0.1560 0.0060 0.0028 0.0101 
1998 11 1413 1163 831.5 250 0.3007 0.6993 0.1826 0.0785 0.3539 0.0059 0.0045 0.0220 
~- -
Based on Table 4.4, years 5 and 11 posed the greatest risks of new company failure, with a failure rate of 38 percent and 30 percent respectively. 
The observed failure rate in year 11 was very different from the estimated failure rate 7.9 percent in the probability density column. 
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Table 4.5 Life Table and Standard Errors of Christchurch Registered Companies based on Discontinuance Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During To Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probability Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminating Surviving at End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 0 1235 0 1235 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 1235 0 1235 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1989 2 1235 0 1235 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1990 3 1235 a 1235 a 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1991 4 1235 0 1235 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1992 5 1235 0 1235 448 0.3628 0.6372 0.6372 0.3628 0.4443 0.0137 0.0137 0.0204 
1993 6 787 0 787 130 0.1652 0.8348 0.5320 0.1053 0.1801 0.0142 0.0087 0.0157 
1994 7 657 0 657 111 0.1689 0.8311 0.4421 0.0899 0.1845 0.0141 0.0081 0.0174 
1995 8 546 0 546 140 0.2564 0.7436 0.3287 0.1134 0.2941 0.0134 0.0090 0.0246 
1996 9 406 0 406 76 0.1872 0.8128 0.2672 0.0615 0.2065 0.0126 0.0068 0.0236 
1997 10 330 0 330 83 0.2515 0.7485 0.20.00 0.0672 0.2877 0.0114 0.0071 0.0313 
1998 11 247 195 149.5 52 0.3478 0.6522 0.1304 0.0696 0.4211 0.0108 0.0087 0.0571 
Based on Table 4.5, year 5 and year 11 are particularly high-risk years (as in Table 4.4) with 36.3 percent and 34.8 percent new company failure 
rates respectively. It is also of interest that year 10 had a relatiyely high failure rate compared with Auckland and Wellington for the same 
period. Also as in Table 4.4, the observed failure rates and the estimated rates for years 10 and 11 were very different (25.2 percent versus 6.7 
percent and 34.8 percent versus 7 percent respectively). 
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Table 4.6 Life Table and Standard Errors of Wellington Registered Companies based on Discontinuance Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul , 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During To Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probability Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminating Surviving at End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 0 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1989 2 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1990 3 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1991 4 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1992 5 2219 0 2219 692 0.3119 0.6881 0.6881 0.3119 0.3695 0.0098 0.0098 0.0138 
1993 6 1527 0 1527 379 0.2482 0.7518 0.5174 0.1708 0.2834 0.0106 0.0080 0.0144 
1994 7 1148 0 1148 142 0.1237 0.8763 0.4534 0.0640 0.1318 0.0106 0.0052 0.0110 
1995 8 1006 0 1006 219 0.2177 0.7823 0.3547 0.0987 0.2443 0.0102 0.0063 0.0164 
1996 9 787 0 787 135 0.1715 0.8285 0.2938 0.0608 0.1876 0.0097 0.0051 0.0161 
1997 10 652 0 652 98 0.1503 0.8497 0.2497 0.0442 0.1625 0.0092 0.0044 0.0164 
1998 11 554 455 326.5 99 0.3032 0.6968 0.1740 0.0757 0.3574 0.0090 0.0069 0.0353 
Table 4.6 confirms the trend of previous tables: years 5 and 11 are high-risk years with failure rates of 31.2 percent and 30.3 percent 
respectively. Wellington seems to experience a follow-on effect with year 6 also being particularly susceptible to failure (24.8 percent). Again, 
the observed and the estimated failure rates were very different for year 11 with an estimation of 7.6 percent and an observation of 30.3 percent 
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4.3.2 Liquidation 
From Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and Figure 4.4 the researcher infers the following results. Based 
on the narrow measure liquidation, 12.5 percent of Auckland companies registered in 1987 
failed within 10 years of operation, 9.5 percent of Christchurch companies failed and 11 
percent of Wellington companies failed. At the end of the measurement window (11 
years), 13.7 percent of Auckland companies registered in 1987 failed, 11.7 percent of 
Christchurch companies failed and 13.1 percent of Wellington companies failed. This 
meant an average annual failure rate of 1.2 percent for Auckland companies, 1.1 percent 
for Christchurch companies and 1.2 percent for Wellington companies. Figure 4.4, again, 
illustrates that the greatest regional variation occurs in the latter half of the measurement 
window. 
Figure 4.4 Survival and Hazard Curves based on Regional Liquidation Data 
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Table 4.7 Test Statistics for Regional differences based on Liquidation Data 
Number Number Percent 
Region Total Events Censored Censored 
Auckland 5413 711 4702 86.86 Statistic df Significance 
Christchurch 1235 131 1104 89.39 Log Rank 6.14 2 0.0463 
Wellington 2219 268 1951 87.92 Breslow 6.02 2 0.0494 
Overall 8867 1110 7757 87.48 Tarone-Ware 6.08 2 0.0478 
The test statistic in Table 4.7 as for Table 4.3, represents the observed failure rate minus 
the expected failure rate under the null hypothesis of no group differences. The higher this 
statistic, the greater the evidence against the null hypothesis. All three tests for equality 
have significance levels less than .05. From Table 4.7, the researcher infers that from the 
test statistics and levels of significance, based on the measure liquidation, there were slight 
regional variations in company failure rates between Auckland, Christchurch and 
Wellington in the period studied. As shown in Figure 4.4, the majority of this variation 
seems to occur in the latter half of the measurement window, from year 7 on. Under the 
.---
measure liquidation there is sufficient statistical evidence to suggest that for the period 
studied, Christchurch had the best survival rates, followed by Wellington and Auckland. 
Table 4.8 Life Table and Standard Errors of Auckland Registered Companies based on Liquidation Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During To Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probability Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminating Surviving At End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 0 5413 0 5413 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 5413 0 5413 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1989 2 5413 0 5413 1 0.0002 0.9998 0.9998 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
1990 3 5412 0 5412 2 0.0004 0.9996 0.9994 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
1991 4 5410 0 5410 78 0.0144 0.9856 0.9850 0.0144 0.0145 0.0017 0.0016 ·0.0016 
1992 5 5332 0 5332 118 0.0221 0.9779 0.9632 0.0218 0.0224 0.0026 0.0020 0.0021 
1993 6 5214 0 5214 105 0.0201 0.9799 0.9438 0.0194 0.0203 0.0031 0.0019 0.0020 
1994 7 5109 0 5109 83 0.0162 0.9838 0.9285 0.0153 0.0164 0.0035 0.0017 0.0018 
1995 8 5026 0 5026 191 0.0380 0.9620 0.8932 ·0.0353 0.0387 0.0042 0.0025 0.0028 
1996 9 4835 0 4835 55 0.0114 0.9886 0.8831 0.0102 0.0114 0.0044 0.0014 0.0015 
1997 10 4780 0 4780 44 0.0092 0.9908 0.8749 0.0081 0.0092 0.0045 0.0012 0.0014 
1998 11 4736 4702 2385 34 0.0143 0.9857 0.8625 0.0125 0.0144 0.0049 0.0021 0.0025 
--
Based on Table 4.8, the highest probability of failure occurred in year 8 with 3.8 percent of companies failing. This figure was fairly consistent, 
with the estimated failure rate in the probability density column at 3.5 percent. Year 5 also carried relatively high risk, with 2.2 percent of 
companies actually failing and 2.18 percent estimated to fail. 
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Table 4.9 Life Table and Standard Errors of Christchurch Registered Companies based on Liquidation Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During To Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probability Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminating Surviving at End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 0 1235 0 1235 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 1235 0 1235 1 0.0008 0.9992 0.9992 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
1989 2 1234 0 1234 0 0.0000 1.0000 0.9992 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
1990 3 1234 0 1234 0 0.0000 1.0000 0.9992 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
1991 4 1234 0 1234 14 0.0113 0.9887 0.9879 0.0113 0.0114 0.0031 0.0030 0.0030 
1992 5 1220 0 1220 29 0.0238 0.9762 0.9644 0.0235 0.0241 0.0053 0.0043 0.0045 
1993 6 1191 0 1191 19 0.0160 0.9840 0.9490 0.0154 0.0161 0.0063 0.0035 0.0037 
1994 7 1172 0 1172 30 0.0256 0.9744 0.9247 0.0243 0.0259 0.0075 0.0044 0.0047 
1995 8 1142 0 1142 13 0.0114 0.9886 0.9142 0.0105 0.0114 0.0080 0.0029 0.0032 
1996 9 1129 0 1129 3 0.0027 0.9973 0.9117 0.0024 0.0027 0.0081 0.0014 0.0015 
1997 10 1126 0 1126 8 0.0071 0.9929 0.9053 0.0065 0.0071 0.0083 0.0023 0.0025 
1998 11 1118 1104 566 14 0.0247 0.9753 0.8829 0.0224 0.0250 0.0100 0.0059 0.0067 
--
Table 4.9 shows that year 5 and 7 had the greatest relative risk, with company failure rates of 2.4 percent and 2.6 percent respectively. These 
figures were reasonably consistent with the estimated probabilities of 2.35 percent and 2.43 percent, respectively, in the probability density 
column. 
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Table 4.10 Life Table and Standard Errors of Wellington Registered Companies based on Liquidation Data 
Number Number Number Number Cumul 
Intrvl Entrng Wdrawn Exposed Of Propn SE of SE of SE of 
Start This During To Termnl Propn Propn Surv Probability Hazard Cumul Probability Hazard 
Year Time Intrvl Intrvl Risk Events Terminating Surviving at End Density Rate Surviving Density Rate 
1987 0 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1988 1 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1989 2 2219 0 2219 0 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1990 3 2219 0 2219 1 0.0005 0.9995 0.9995 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
1991 4 2218 0 2218 34 0.0153 0.9847 0.9842 0.0153 0.0154 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 
1992 5 2184 0 2184 18 0.0082 0.9918 0.9761 0.0081 0.0083 0.0032 0.0019 0.0020 
1993 6 2166 0 2166 79 0.0365 0.9635 0.9405 0.0356 0.0372 0.0050 0.0039 0.0042 
1994 7 2087 0 2087 35 0.0168 0.9832 0.9247 0.0158 0.0169 0.0056 0.0026 0.0029 
1995 8 2052 0 2052 15 0.0073 0.9927 0.9180 0.0068 0.0073 0.0058 0.0017 0.0019 
1996 9 2037 0 2037 41 0.0201 0.9799 0.8995 0.0185 0.0203 0.0064 0.0029 0.0032 
1997 10 1996 0 1996 22 0.0110 0.9890 0.8896 0.0099 0.0111 0.0067 0.0021 0.0024 
1998 11 1974 1951 998.5 23 0.0230 0.9770 0.8691 0.0205 0.0233 0.0078 0.0042 0.0049 
The figures in Table 4.10 show that years 6 and 9 were relatively high-risk years with company failure rates of 3.7 percent and 2.0 percent 
respectively. These findings were relatively consistent with thti estimated failure rates of 3.56 percent and 1.85 percent respectively. Year 11 was 
also a high-risk year, with 2.3 percent of companies failing compared with 2.1 percent expected in the probability density column. 
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4.3.3 Summary 
This study shows that based on statistical evidence, there were regional variations in new 
company failure rates for the period studied using both the broad measure, discontinuance 
for any reason and the narrow measure, liquidation. The measure discontinuance for any 
reason resulted in levels of significance of .0008 and .0157 for the log-rank and Tarone-
Ware tests, respectively, which are under the required level of .05. The Breslow test was 
tending towards significance with a .0582 level of significance. The researcher concludes 
that there is sufficient statistical evidence to suggest that, using the discontinuance for any 
reason measure, Auckland had the best company survival rate, followed by Wellington and 
Christchurch. 
The tests for equality are all statistically significant under the measure liquidation. 
These tests demonstrate that Christchurch had the best company survival rate, followed by 
Wellington and Auckland. The answer to the first research question is: yes, there were 
regional variations in new company failure rates for the period studied. The study confirms 
: .:- ~ :-. . " 
the second hypothesis and found that there were small variations in new company failure 
rates during the period studied under both measures. The study disproves the third and 
fourth hypotheses, however, as the order of greatest company survival rate: Wellington, 
Christchurch, Auckland did not occur under either measure. 
4.4 Cox Regression with Time-Varying Covariates 
This section addresses the third research question posed in Section 2.8: What are the 
determinants of regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch? The researcher investigated the five variables: population, 
unemployment, average weekly wage, average house price and Consumer Price Index 
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individually in order to identify levels of significance. The researcher then combined the 
five variables in a single model and investigated the levels of significance. The researcher 
also constructed a correlation table to investigate the presence of multicollinearity, which 
will effect the levels of significance reported and variables that can be modeled together. A 
revised Cox regression model is then calculated by the researcher based on the measures 
used in this study. 
4.4.1 Discontinuance for any reason 
Table 4.11 provides the individually calculated levels of significance for the five variables. 
Based on Table 4.11, the variables unemployment,average house price and population are 
significant when calculated individually. The variables average weekly wage and 
Consumer Price Index are nearing significance at .06 and .063 respectively. These findings 
suggest that the three variables unemployment, average house price and population 
contribute to the rate of new company failure using discontinuancefor any reason as the 
measure of failure. That is, the three variables have a degree of explanatory power when 
calculated individually. 
Table 4.11 Cox regression calculated individually using Discontinuance 
Variable 8 S.E. Wald d.f. Significan R Exp(8) 
Consumer Price Index .0078 .0042 
Unemployment -1.93 7.146 
Average weekly wage -8.61 4.581 
Average House Price -1.24 3.582 
Population -9.43 4.078 
Scale used for Column Band S.E. Column 
Consumer Price Index=OOOs 
Unemployment=OO,OOOs 
Average weekly wage=OOOs 
Average House Price=OOO,OOOs 
Population=O,OOO,OOOs 
3.4444 1 .0635 .0034 1.0078 
7.2908 1 .0069 -.0066 1.0000 
3.5299 1 .0603 -.0035 .9991 
12.0244 1 .0005 -.0091 1.0000 
5.3503 1 .0207 -.0052 1.0000 
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Table 4.12 Cox regression calculated together using Discontinuance 
Variable 8 S.E. Wald df Significan R Exp(8) 
Consumer Price Index .0364 .0130 7.8045 1 .0052 .0069 1.0371 
Unemployment -1.98 1.112 3.1837 1 .0744 -.0031 1.0000 
Average weekly wage 7.011 .0012 .0034 1 .9536 .0000 1.0001 
Average House Price -4.29 2.390 3.2284 1 .0724 .0032 1.0000 
Population 1.127 9.305 1.4673 1 .2258 .0000 1.0000 
Table 4.12 illustrates the problem of multicollinearity: variables are linked, which affects 
their levels of significance and ultimately their explanatory power. Based on Table 4.12, 
the only variable that illustrates significance when calculated, as a single model is 
Consumer Price Index. This finding means that multicollinearity exists within the model, 
which limits the variables that may be included because the variables measure the same 
phenomenon. This problem will be discussed in detail later in this section. 
4.4.2 Liquidation 
The researcher calculated five variables Consumer Price Index, unemployment, average 
weekly wage, average house price and population individually using the measure 
liquidation. Then, also using the liquidation measure,·the researcher calculated the five 
variables together as a single model. The results of these analyses are presented below. 
Table 4.13 Cox regression calculated individually using Liquidation 
1-··· 
I < .. 
Variable 8 S.E. Wald df Significan R Exp(8) 
Consumer Price Index .0289 .0115 6.3543 1 .0117 .0147 1.0294 
Unemployment 4.084 1.848 4.8824 1 .0271 .0120 1.0000 
Average weekly wage .0015 .0012 1.6631 1 .1972 .0000 1.0015 
Average House Price 1.542 8.741 3.1135 1 .0776 .0075 1.0000 
Population 2.131 1.040 4.2002 1 .0404 .0105 1.0000 
Table 4.13 illustrates that the three variables Consumer Price Index, unemployment and 
population are all significant. This finding suggests that the three variables Consumer Price 
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Index, unemployment and population contribute to new company failure when using the 
measure liquidation and calculated individually. Tables 4.11 and 4.13 agree that both the 
variables unemployment and population have explanatory power when calculated 
individually, regardless of the measure that is used. 
Table 4.14 Cox regression calculated together using Liquidation 
Variable 8 S.E. Wald df Significan R Exp(8) 
Consumer Price Index .0394 .0215 3.3463 1 .0674 .0082 1.0402 
Unemployment 1.963 1.433 1.8756 1 .1708 .0000 1.0000 
Average weekly wage 9.846 .0022 .2085 1 .6480 .0000 1.0010 
Average House Price 4.823 3.307 .0002 1 .9884 .0000 1.0000 
Population -1.11 1.161 .9067 1 .3410 .0000 1.0000 
Table 4.14 shows that none of the five variables are statistically significant when 
incorporated into one model using the measure liquidation. Consumer Price Index seems to 
be the closest with a level of significance of .067. The difference in significance levels 
reported between Tables 4.13 and 4.14 suggest that the variables may correlate in some 
way. This means that two or more of the variables measure the same phenomenon and 
therefore cancel each other out when included in the same model. 
4.4.3 Correlation between Explanatory Variables 
Table 4.15 illustrates that there are a number of correlations that may account for the 
contradictory findings reported above. The major relationships are 
unemployment-population, average weekly wage-Consumer Price Index and average 
weekly wage-average house price. These relationships are not surprising, considering the 
obvious linkages. First, unemployment is measured in numbers of residents over 15 years 
that are registered as unemployed, and population is measured as total number of residents 
within a region. In this case, the level of unemployment will naturally increase as the 
:",:,:,~-:-.-.:.;:. :..;.-. ~;:~. 
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population increases. The study could overcome this problem by measuring unemployment 
as a percentage of regional population, in which case the percentage of unemployed will 
not necessarily increase along with population. Alternatively, one of these variables could 
be excluded from the model, as with any other variables that are significantly linked. 
Table 4.15 Correlations between the five explanatory variables 
CPI UNEMP 
CPI Pearson Correlation 1.000 .351' 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 
N 36 36 
UNEMP Pearson Correlation .351* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 
N 36 36 
WAGES Pearson Correlation .792*' .088 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .644 
N 36 36 
HOUSEPRI Pearson Correlation .689*' .616** 
POP 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 36 36 
Pearson Correlation .130 .838" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .449 .000 
N 36 36 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-talled). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
WAGES HOUSEPRI 
.792*' .689** 
.000 .000 
30 36 
.088 .616** 
.644 .000 
30 36 
1.000 .719** 
.000 
30 36 
.719*' 1.000 
.000 
30 36 
.154 .665** 
.417 .000 
30 36 
POP 
.130 
.449 
36 
.838** 
.000 
36 
.154 
.417 
36 
.665'* 
.000 
36 
1.000 
36 
There is also a direct link between the variables average weekly wage and the 
Consumer Price Index. In this case, as the average weekly wage increases so does the 
Consumer Price Index. This formal link is commonly known as inflation. The high level of 
multicollinearity between the variables average weekly wage and Consumer Price Index 
illustrated in Table 4.15 means that the same model should not include both variables. 
The third main link is between the variables average weekly wage and average 
house price. Again, because of inflation, as the average weekly wage increases so does the 
cost of goods and services in order to generate this extra income. Therefore, the researcher 
concludes that the variables average weekly wage and average house price should not be 
included in the same model. Based on these findings the researcher considers that a single 
',' >, :- ... ", .-~'., 
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model including the three variables Consumer Price Index, unemployment and average 1------------:--------
,:« .:.:,-.:. :~:.~.:<~: 
house price may be useful in explaining regional variations in new company failure. 
Table 4.16 Revised Cox regression model based on Discontinuance for any reason 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Significan R Exp(B) 
Consumer Price Index .0478 .0067 50.6605 1 .0000 .0200 1.0489 
Unemployment -4.91 1.246 15.5318 1 .0001 -.0105 1.0000 
Average House Price -2.28 5.602 16.5313 1 .0000 -.0109 1.0000 
The revised Cox regression model based on the measure discontinuance for any reason 
(Table 4.16) illustrates that this model is a good fit. Based on this finding the researcher 
considers that such a model would be useful when attempting to explain reasons for 
regional variation in new company failure rates. 
Based on the measure liquidation the revised Cox regression model (Table 4.17) 
illustrates that the three variables Consumer Price Index, unemployment and average house 
price are not a good fit in a single model. The low levels of significance illustrate this 
point, all of which are under the .05 standard. Therefore, the researcher believes that a ... -:-
single model can not be constructed based on the measure liquidation and the variables 
available for analysis. 
Table 4.17 Revised Cox regression model based on Liquidation 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Significan R Exp(B) 
Consumer Price Index .0283 .0162 3.0436 1 .0811 .0072 1.0287 
Unemployment 3.356 2.847 1.3900 1 .2384 .0000 1.0000 
Average House Price -1.23 1.552 .6247 1 .4293 .0000 1.0000 
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4.4.4 Summary 
The results of the Cox regression with time-varying covariates illustrate multicollinearity 
problems. For example, when calculated individually using the measure discontinuance for 
any reason, the researcher found that the three variables unemployment, average house 
price and popUlation are statistically significant. When the researcher included the 
variables in the same model, however, only Consumer Price Index is statistically 
significant. The reason for this is that multicollinearity exists between the variables, which 
means that a number of the variables are measuring the same phenomenon and should not 
be included together in the same model. The results in Table 4.15 illustrate this problem, 
and the study found major links between unemployment and population, average weekly 
wage and Consumer Price Index and average weekly wage and average house price. A 
revised Cox regression was constructed and tested based on the measure discontinuance 
for any reason. From Table 4.16 the researcher found that the revis~d model fits the data 
well when using discontinuance for any reason as a measure of company failure. The 
researcher, therefore, suggests that the model in Table 4.16 is helpful when explaining 
regional variations in new company failure based on the measure discontinuance for any 
reason. 
The multicollinearity problem addressed above is also evident when measuring 
company failure in terms of liquidation. Table 4.13 illustrates that when calculated 
individually using the measure liquidation, the researcher found that the three variables 
Consumer Price Index, unemployment and population are statistically significant. When 
the researcher included the variables in the same model, however, none of the variables 
seemed to be significant. The closest is Consumer Price Index with a level of significance 
of .0674. The researcher concludes that these disparities are the result of multicollinearity, 
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as discussed above, which means that certain variables are correlated and should not all be 
included in the same model. From Table 4.17 the researcher found that a single model 
could not be constructed using the variables that were available for analysis and based on 
the liquidation measure of company failure. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the analyses undertaken in the study. To summarise, 
the study undertook analyses on companies registered in 1987 in the three main urban 
centres of New Zealand (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch). The study tracked the 
progress of these companies over an II-year period. The analyses used pooled data 
as representative of New Zealand in general. To investigate the presence of regional 
variations, the researcher segmented the data based on the three main urban areas 
(Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch). Finally, the study analysed five macro economic 
and social variables using the Cox regression with time-varying covariates procedure. The 
researcher used the results of this analysis to measure the explanatory power of these 
variables and therefore their contribution to the observed regional variation. 
Based on the discontinuance for any reason measure, the study notes that average 
mortality or failure rate of new companies registered in 1987 was 7.5 percent per annum, 
i;;;:····:··,<,·;·;· 
or 82.7 percent of companies failed within 11 years of operation. The data shows a long .. 
period of adolescence (5 years) before initial company failures occurred, with a median 
survival time of 7.54 years and mean survival time of 8 years. As the researcher expected, 
there were lower new company failure rates reported using the measure liquidation. Based 
on the liquidation measure, the average new company failure rate was 1.2 percent per 
annum, or 13.3 percent of companies failed within 11 years of operation. The median 
survival time was 11 years and the mean survival time was 10 years. The period preceding 
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year 4 showed small levels of new company failure at which stage failures significantly 
increased. 
When segmenting the data into regions, the researcher drew the following 
conclusions. Based on the measure discontinuance for any reason, 81.7 percent of 
Auckland registered companies failed within 11 years of operation, 87 percent of 
Christchurch registered companies failed and 82.6 percent of Wellington registered 
companies failed. These figures equate to an average annual failure rate of 7.4 percent for 
Auckland companies, 7.9 percent for Christchurch companies and 7.5 percent for 
Wellington companies. Therefore, based on the measure discontinuance for any reason, 
Auckland had the lowest new company failure rate, followed by Wellington and 
Christchurch. 
Based on the measure liquidation, 13.7 percent of Auckland registered 
companies failed within 11 years of operation, 11.7 percent of Christchurch registered 
companies failed and 13.1 percent of Wellington registered companies failed. This 
meant an average annual failure rate of 1.2 percent for Auckland companies, 1.1 
percent for Christchurch companies and 1.2 percent for Wellington companies. 
Therefore, based on the measure liquidation, Christchurch registered companies had 
the lowest new company failure rate, followed by Wellington and Auckland. 
Based on the test statistics for equality (log-rank, Breslow and Tarone-Ware), 
the researcher found sufficient statistical evidence to suggest that there were small regional 
variations in new company failure rates for the period studied based on both measures. 
The results of the Cox regression with time-varying covariates suggest to the 
researcher that multicollinearity exists between the five macro economic and social 
variables Consumer Price Index, unemployment, average weekly wage, average house 
price and population. The effects of this are evident in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, in which the 
statistically significant variables, when calculated individually were unemployment, 
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average house price and population. When included in the same model the variables cancel 
each other out, leaving only Consumer Price Index as significant. This problem is iterated 
in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, in which the statistically significant variables, when calculated 
individually, were Consumer Price Index, unemployment and population. When included 
in the same model, none of the variables seem to be significant. 
Table 4.15 examines the levels of correlation between the variables. The researcher 
found that the major linkages were unemployment~population, average weekly 
wage~Consumer Price Index and average weekly wage~average house price. The 
linkages mean that these variables represent the same phenomenon and should therefore 
not be included in the same model. The researcher found that, the revised Cox regression 
model including the three variables unemployment, Consumer Price Index and average 
house price was a good fit for discontinuance data, but not a good fit for liquidation data. 
Based on this finding, the researcher concludes that using the measure discontinuance for 
any reason, the variables unemployment, Consumer Price Index and average house price 
contribute to new company failure and hence help explain regionatyariations. Based on the 
I',;' 
measure liquidation, however, no single model could be constructed using the variables 
available to the researcher. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion 
This chapter discusses the results obtained by the researcher as detailed in Chapter Four. 
Highlighted in Chapter five are the important findings, the implications for, and 
contributions of these findings to, the study of new company failure in New Zealand. The 
researcher has divided Chapter five into six main sections that deal with the following. 
Section One addresses national rates of new company failure. Section Two examines 
regional variation in new company failure rates. SeCtion Three discusses the results of the 
Cox regression test and the determinants of regional variation in new company failure 
rates. Section Four identifies and explains the limitations of this study. Section Five 
identifies possible directions for future research. Finally, Section Six summarises the 
researcher's findings and the implications of these on future research into new company 
failure rates within New Zealand. 
5.1 National rates of new company failure 
The first research question this study addresses is: What is the failure rate of new 
companies in New Zealand for the period studied? The hypothesis of the researcher 
relating to this question supports the liability of newness concept, that: failure rates of 
companies will be higher in the early years of operation regardless of region. 
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5.1.1 Discontinuance for any reason 
Based on the research measure discontinuance for any reason there is strong evidence in 
the researcher's findings of the concept liability of adolescence in national rates of new 
company failure as offered by Briiderl and SchUssler (1990) and outlined in Chapter Two 
Section 2.3.3. The period of adolescence in this study was five years. The failure rate then 
increases sharply with a 35.8 percent probability of company failure in year five (see Table 
4.1 Chapter Four). Therefore, based on the measure discontinuance for any reason used in 
this study, see hypothesis 1 (Chapter Two, Section 2.8), the liability of newness concept is 
rejected. The national new company failure rate over the period 1987 to 1998 (using 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch as a representative sample) based on Table 4.1 is 
as follows: 82.7 percent of companies registered with the companies office in 1987 failed 
within the first 11 years of operation, an average annual company failure rate of 7.5 percent 
during the II-year period; the mean survival time of new companies was 7.54 years and the 
median survival time was 8 years. 
The implications, for business people, of these findings follow. Based on the 
measure discontinuance for any reason, the researcher believes that when a business is 
established the entrepreneur will experience a period of time in which the business's initial 
stock of resources and the lack of accurate financial information concerning performance 
will prevent the failure of the company. At the conclusion of this period failure rates 
increase drastically with a 35.8 percent probability of failure (reported in this study) in year 
5. The researcher believes that the presence of a long period of adolescence (longer than 4 
years) can imply that accounting and other reporting procedures are lacking or insufficient. 
Therefore, this study suggests that lending institutes and entrepreneurs implement into their 
business plans high quality reporting procedures in order to monitor business performance 
and allow for strategy adjustment. The researcher suggests, however, that these findings be 
1"-;-~'~-~":'~-;""::::-":-~~-:':'~ 
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interpreted with caution, as the initial period of adolescence may simply be an artifact of 
the database maintenance procedure. Section 5.4 outlines further concerns in regard to 
maintenance, and limitations of the database. 
There are consistencies when comparing this study's findings with other studies 
using discontinuance for any reason as a measure of company failure. Examples of these 
consistencies in new company failure rates include: Hamilton (1984) who reported a new 
company failure rate of 4.8-6.4 percent per annum in Scotland; Stewart and Gallagher 
(1985) who reported a new company failure rate of 8.1 percent per annum in the United 
Kingdom; Bates & Nucci (1989) who reported a new company failure rate of 7.5 percent 
per annum in America. The results of this study lie in this range with an average new 
company failure rate of 7.5 percent per annum for the period 1987 to 1998. 
5.1.2 Liquidation 
Based on the measure liquidation there is evidence suggesting a perIod of adolescence, 
although somewhat weaker than the previous measure. Based on the researcher's findings 
of national new company failure rates for the period 1987-1998 there were only five new 
company failures before year four (1991), at which point the new company failure rate 
significantly increased (see Table 4.2 Chapter Four). According to Table 4.2 the highest 
risk period of a company being placed into liquidation occurred within year 5 to year 8. 
Results overall showed 13.3 percent of companies who registered with the Companies 
Office in 1987 failed within the first 11 years of operation, this is an average annual failure 
rate of 1.2 percent, a median survival time of 11 years and a mean survival time of ten 
years. Therefore, based on the measure liquidation, hypothesis 1: that new company 
failure rates will be higher in the early years of operation, regardless of region, is again 
rejected in favour of a liability of adolescence. 
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Based on these findings it is evident that there is, again, a period in which the initial 
stock of a company and the lack of accurate financial information concerning performance 
will prolong the survival of a company. The researcher believes that this finding is 
important for credit providers when granting finance and setting interest rates because the 
findings in this study suggest that the highest risk of business failure occurs within year 
five to year eight. The researcher's findings also suggest that lending institutes should 
demand more frequent and accurate business performance reports. Again, the researcher 
believes that the reader should use caution when interpreting the results of this study as 
they may be skewed due to poor database maintenance. 
There are, again, consistencies when comparing these results with that of other 
studies which used a similar measure of failure. Examples of these consistencies include 
results from studies carried out by: Massel (1978) who reported a new company failure 
rate of 0.48 percent per annum in America and Cahill (1980) who reported a new company 
failure rate of 0.7-1.3 percent per annum in Australia. The average new company failure 
rate that was reported by the researcher in this study, based on the measure liquidation, was 
L"~ ,> . " 
1.2 percent per annum. 
5.2 Regional variations in new company failure rates 
The second research question examined in this study is: Is there any regional variation in 
new company failure rates between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch for the period 
studied? The hypotheses of the researcher relating to this question are: There will be 
regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, Wellington and. 
Christchurch for the period studied; Wellington will have had the lowest new company 
failure rate for the period studied; Christchurch will have had the second lowest new 
company failure rate for the period studied. 
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5.2.1 Discontinuance for any reason 
Based on the researcher's earlier measure discontinuance for any reason there is sufficient 
statistical evidence to suggest small amounts of regional variation in new company failure 
rates. The researcher in Chapter Four Table 4.3 illustrates this finding. The log-rank and 
Tarone-ware statistics described in Chapter Three Section 3.7.2 were both statistically 
significant with a .0008 and .0157 level of significance respectively. The Breslow test also 
described in Chapter Three Section 3.7.2 was tending towards statistical significance with a 
.0582 level of significance. The test statistics were high for the log-rank test (14.16) and 
the Tarone-Ware test (8.30), but lower for the Breslow test (5.69). These statistics represent 
the differences between the observed company failure rates and expected company failure 
rates under the null hypothesis of no group difference (the higher the statistic, the greater 
the evidence against the null hypothesis). Based on these statistics, and the levels of 
significance, the researcher believes that the answer to the second research question in this 
study: Is there any regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch for the period studied?, is that there are small regional 
~- -", - -_._-- -
variations in new company failure rates between Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington 
.-.... _ .. _-.-
for the period 1987-1998. 
The researcher breaks down results of the regional variations as follows: based on 
the measure discontinuance for any reason Christchurch had the highest failure rate with 
87 percent of companies failing within the first 11 years of operation, this equals an 
average annual failure rate of 7.9 percent. Wellington experienced the second highest 
failure rate with 82.6 percent of companies failing within the first 11 years of operation, 
equaling an average annual failure rate of 7.5 percent. Auckland had the lowest failure rate 
with 81.7 percent of companies failing within the first 11 years of operation, which equaled 
an average annual failure rate of 7.4 percent. 
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These regional variations confirm the researcher's second hypothesis, based on the 
measure discontinuance for any reason that new company failure rates vary between 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, for the period 1987 to 1998. The researcher's 
third hypothesis, that Wellington will have a lower new company failure rate than 
Auckland and Christchurch for the period 1987 to 1998 is disproved. The researcher found 
that Auckland, rather than Wellington, had the lowest new company failure rate. The fourth 
hypothesis proposed by the researcher was also disproved as results show Auckland to 
have a lower new company failure rate than Christchurch. 
5.2.2 Liquidation 
Based on the measure liquidation there is again sufficient statistical evidence to suggest 
small levels of regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch. Table 4.7 (Chapter Four) shows there is little difference in 
the test statistics (log-rank 6.14, Breslow 6.02 and Tarone-Ware 6.(8) and that all three 
tests are statistically significant. The level of significance for the log-rank test was .0463; 
the Breslow test .0494; the Tarone-Ware test .0478. These levels of significance are all 
under the required .05 level standard and the test statistics are sufficient in order to prove in 
this study that small levels of regional variation in new company failure rates were present 
between Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington for the period 1987 to 1998. 
Auckland had the highest rate of new company failure under the liquidation 
measure: 13.7 percent of companies registered in 1987 failed within the first 11 years of 
operation, this equates to an average annual failure rate of 1.2 percent. Wellington had the 
second highest new company failure rate with 13.1 percent of companies failing within the 
first 11 years of operation, equaling an average annual failure rate of 1.2 percent. 
Christchurch had the lowest new company failure rate based on the above measure with 
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·11.7 percent of companies failing within the first 11 years of operation, which equaled an 
average annual failure rate of 1.1 percent. 
This finding confirms the researcher's second hypothesis, that there is small levels 
of regional variation in new company failure rates for the period 1987 to 1998, and so 
using the statistics above answers the second research question: Is there any regional 
variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch for 
the period studied? The findings presented in this study, however, disprove the researcher's 
third hypothesis: Wellington would have the lowest new company failure rate for the 
period 1987 to 1998. The results of this study indicate that Wellington in fact had the 
second highest new company failure rate using liquidation as the measure of failure. The 
researcher's fourth hypothesis: that Christchurch would have a higher new company 
failure rate than Wellington, but lower new company failure rate than Auckland was 
partially proved as Christchurch had a lower new company failure rate than Auckland, but 
as the results suggest also a lower new company failure rate than Wellington. 
---
Watson & Everett (1993) suggest that larger companies are more likely to be placed 
into formal liquidation due to larger borrowings and assets accumulated. The researcher 
investigated this premise as a reason for the different company failure rates, based on the 
findings and the popular belief that Auckland has relatively larger companies. The 
researcher found, however, that based on the size measure FfE (full-time equivalent 
persons engaged) there were only marginal differences in company sizes between the three 
regions for the period studied: 1991 50-99(FfE) 1.1 percent of Auckland companies; 1.2 
percent of Wellington companies; 1.1 percent of Christchurch companies; 100+(FfE) 0.6 
percent of Auckland companies; 1.0 percent of Wellington companies; 0.7 percent of 
Christchurch companies (Business Activity Statistics, 1991). Based on these and similar 
statistics, the premise offered by Watson & Everett was rejected as a viable explanation for 
regional variation in this study. 
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5.2.3 Summary 
The implications of these findings in regard to the researcher's hypotheses follow. First the 
researcher confidently concludes that under both measures of company failure: 
discontinuance for any reason and liquidation there are small regional variations in new 
company failure rates between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch for companies 
registered with the Companies Office in the year 1987. These findings imply to the 
researcher that: the future prospects of a company are influenced by both the local 
economy and the national economy; local economic conditions and the risks associated 
with operating a company in such conditions should be continually monitored; the risk of 
company failure varies regionally; regional risk information should be available to the 
public and to policy makers; respective interest rates should reflect the relative risk 
associated with new company failure; rates of new company failure in individual regions 
should not necessarily be assumed to be representative of the entire country. 
5.3 Cox regression with time-varying co variates 
The third research question addressed in this study is: What are the determinants of 
regional variation in new company failure rates between Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch for the period studied. No a priori hypotheses are proposed concerning this 
research question. 
5.3.1 Discontinuance for any reason 
Based on the researcher's earlier measure of company failure discontinuance for any 
reason, there were conflicting findings concerning levels of significance of the five 
l-:;.:..:.·.:':':-:·:';-:'-:-;~.·:~: 
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independent variables: Consumer Price Index, unemployment, average weekly wage, ------
~.:.--·--·-·_-.~·L-.·.~.~. 
average house price and population. When the variables were calculated individually it was 
found by the researcher that unemployment, average house price and population were all 
. statistically significant. This would indicate to the researcher that these variables contribute 
to new company failure rates and therefore variations based on the data analysed in this 
study. When the five variables were included in the same model, however, Consumer Price 
Index was the only statistically significant variable. These results indicate to the researcher 
that multicollinearity exists between two or more of these variables. 
Based on this assumption, the researcher constructed a correlation table in order to 
examine the presence and degree of multicollinearity. The researcher found that the 
variables: unemployment~population, average weekly wage~Consumer Price Index and 
average weekly wage~average house price were highly correlated. The high level of 
multicollinearity indicates to the researcher that these variables should not be included in 
the same model. This is because they measure the same phenomenon and cancel each other 
out in terms of reported significance and hence explanatory power. The researcher believes 
that based on the individually calculated Cox regression model the variables: Consumer 
Price Index, unemployment and average house price could be included in a single model. 
These variables were shown to be statistically significant and are not correlated based on 
Table 4.15. Based on a revised Cox regression model presented in Table 4.16, the 
variables: Consumer Price Index, unemployment and average house price provide a good 
fit when modeled together. The researcher therefore believes based on the discontinuance 
for any reason measure of company failure and the data used in this study that the three 
variables: Consumer Price Index, unemployment and average house price effect new 
company failure. These three variables differ by region and therefore help explain regional 
variations in new company failure rates. The researchers believes that the reader should 
note these variables while helping explain regional variation in new company failure rates, 
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are not necessarily specific determinants of such variation and by no means constitute an 
exhausted list of possible variables. Further research is needed in order to develop a 
comprehensive model in which specific determinants can be identified. 
5.3.2 Liquidation 
Based on the measure liquidation there were, again, conflicting findings concerning the 
levels of significance of the five independent variables. When calculated individually the 
three variables: Consumer Price Index, unemployment and population are all statistically 
significant. This, again, indicated to the researcher based on the measure liquidation and 
the data analysed in this study that these variables have explanatory power and effect new 
company failure and subsequent variations. When included in the same model, however, 
the researcher found that only Consumer Price Index was close to statistical significance at 
the .0674 level. This finding reiterates the problem of multicollinearity discussed above 
and the significant links between: unemployment~ population, average weekly 
wage~Consumer Price Index and average weekly wage~average house price. Based on 
the measure liquidation a revised model, again, incorporating Consumer Price Index, 
unemployment and average house price was constructed. The researcher believes that the 
inclusion of average house price is justified despite having an individually calculated 
significance level of .0776, which is above the standard .05 level. It was suggested that .05 
is an arbitrary level and that .0776 is sufficient to indicate a degree of explanatory power C. 
Frampton (personal communication, February 1999). Based on Table 4.17, however, there 
seems to be no single model that fits the liquidation data using the variables available to 
.'-°. 0 "_ ---<"-:-.-:-:-
the researcher. 
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5.4 Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of limitations, which the researcher believes should be recognised by 
the reader when interpreting the results of this study. These limitations are divided into 
three main categories: database, time period used and macro-economic and social 
variables analysed. 
The first impoitant limitation of this study concerns the substantial flaws in the 
database used by the researcher. First, the database used does not include sole traders and 
partnerships. Turner (1984) suggested that this might exclude up to 50 percent of the 
population of small businesses in New Zealand. This exclusion creates problems for a 
researcher when attempting to generalise research findings. The results of this study are 
therefore only applicable to the business form company. 
The second problem associated with the database used in this study concerns the 
frequency and consistency of strike-off. Devlin (1985) suggested that distortions could 
occur "as a result of a 'purging' of the register from time to time". This problem is 
abundantly obvious in this study and may significantly inflate the long adolescent period 
reported. 
The researcher also believes that, the database lacks accurate and comprehensive 
information on: the owner or manager of the listed company; the location of business 
operations; the number of employees hired; the reason for cessation or liquidation of the 
business including comprehensive financial information. This information could be 
invaluable to a researcher when distinguishing between company failure and company 
closure. 
Two alternative databases were investigated by the researcher as a viable option for 
use in this study. The first of these was Statistics New Zealand's Mega database. The use of 
this relatively new database, however, required a fee of $10,000-$15,000. Due to the 
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limited funds available to the researcher this was not economically viable, and the 
researcher rejected the alternative. 
The second alternative database investigated was the Inland Revenue's G.S.T. 
(Goods and Services Tax) registrations database. This database includes all entities which 
are selling goods or services, the date that they registered for G.S.T. and the date that they 
deregistered or discontinued operation. This was perhaps the most attractive alternative 
database to the researcher as it would include sole traders and partnerships and the 
deregistration dates are likely to be accurate due to tax incentives not to be G.S.T. 
registered if you are not selling goods or services. The database also provides information 
relating to revenue and therefore size and performance prior to failure. The database does, 
however, have some limitations that prevented its use. These limitations included: the fact 
that the name of the entity is confidential prohibiting further investigation into other 
relevant internal variables other than size; records are held on hard copy and only date back 
to 1995. The limitations of the G.S.T database meant that the limited information had to be 
inputted manually and the two measures discontinuance/or any reason and liquidation 
used in this study could not be used due to limited information. This resulted in the 
researcher rejecting the Inland Revenue's G.S.T. database as not viable in terms oftime 
frame available for analysis and measures of company failure available. 
Although the database used in this study contains limitations, the researcher notes 
that the Companies Office statistics in New Zealand do provide an indication of business 
dynamics, and so provide long term trends in business failure rates (Devlin, 1985). In this 
study the average annual failure rate can be inferred with an acceptable degree of 
confidence. The findings concerning specific risks associated with each year of operation, 
however, may well be contaminated by the above problems and should be interpreted with 
caution. 
c __ 
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The study's second area of limitation concerns the time period that was analysed by 
the researcher. The researcher as the starting year in which all companies were incorporated 
selected the year 1987. This may create problems as 1987 was the year of the infamous 
share market crash. It was suggested that many shelf companies (non active entities) were 
. created in this year (particularly in Auckland) which would mean that 1987 would have a 
disproportionately high number of new company registrations and closures (1. Radford 
personal communication, December 1998). After careful examination, the researcher found 
that in fact less companies registered in 1987 (8,867 companies) compared with 1986 
(9,936 companies), 1988 (11,205 companies) and 1989 (14,700 companies). 
It is noted by the researcher that it is possible 1987 registrations are not 
representative of the national company population as a whole, they do, however, represent 
an interesting research study group due to their potentially unique characteristics. This 
study intends to provide researcher's with a "building block" on which future research can 
follow investigating such time dependent considerations. 
The third area of limitation in this study is the set of independent variables that 
were used in the analysis. Due to the inadequacies of the database used in this research the 
availability of independent variables was limited to external economic and social variables 
including: population, unemployment, Consumer Price Index, average weekly wage and 
average house price. Inconsistent reporting procedures by Statistics New Zealand 
concerning regional boundaries and regional information examined compounded the 
limitation of the independent variables. These inadequacies are illustrated by the high 
instances of multicollinearity reported in Table 4.15 (Chapter Four), which examined the 
levels of correlation between all regional variables available. Because of this limitation it is 
not possible to draw reliable inferences from this study concerning exact reasons for new 
company failure, or the reason for regional variations in new company failure rates. 
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5.5 Directions for future research 
This study intends to provide a framework or "building block", which highlights the many 
areas that could be explored by future research. Specifically, this research could entail 
replication of this study in other regions of New Zealand in order to examine differences in 
new company failure rates between rural areas as opposed to the urban areas, which were 
the focus of this study. 
Future research could examine the effect of time on regional variations in company 
failure rates. The researcher believes that this could lead to regular up-dates of regional 
risks associated with starting a new business, perhaps ill the form of a quarterly regional 
risk index or ratio. Benefits, to entrepreneurs and credit companies of such an index or 
ratio could include information for: entrepreneurs concerning the best areas to start a 
business; credit providers concerning relative interest rates; policy makers concerning areas 
within New Zealand in need of attention. 
This study concludes that although only small levels of variation were found, future 
research is needed to investigate the reasons for regional variations in new company failure 
rates. To achieve this a researcher would need to examine beyond currently available data 
sources in order to research both internal and external variables affecting new companies. 
The inclusion of internal variables would allow the finance and management paradigm 
concerning management influence to be examined in comparison to the macro economic 
and ecological paradigm of environmental influence. 
This study, in its conclusion, raises an important issue for the Companies Office to 
consider concerning the improvement of data collection from registered companies; the 
improvement of which would increase the accuracy and scope of information available for 
similar research. The researcher believes that the database could be improved with the 
collection of information relating to the number of employees hired by the company, 
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financial details including possible reasons for closure and details relating to the owners or 
managers of a company. This study also concludes that there is a need for a regular and 
consistent procedure concerning maintenance of the Companies Office database. This 
would increase accuracy of data, its usability and would provide a realistic representation 
of the companies in existence in New Zealand. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Overall, it can be concluded that the measure of company failure used by a researcher has a 
major impact on the rate of new company failure reported. The national average reported in 
this study being consistent with overseas studies using similar measures. The majority of 
new company failures occurred after an initial five-year period, consistent with the liability 
of adolescence theory offered by Bruderl and Schussler (1990). 
There was sufficient statistical evidence to suggest using either discontinuance for 
any reason or liquidation as measures of company failure and the Companies Office data, 
that small amounts of regional variation were present for the period 1987 to 1998. Based 
on the measure discontinuance for any reason, Auckland registered companies had the best 
survival chances; Wellington registered companies had the second best survival chances; 
Christchurch registered companies had the worst survival chances. Based on the measure 
liquidation, however, Christchurch registered companies had the best survival chances; 
Wellington registered companies had the second best survival chances; Auckland 
registered companies had the worst survival chances. 
Based on the Cox regression with time-varying covariates test the model of 
variables recommended to explain regional variation in new company failure rates, using 
discontinuance for any reason as a measure of company failure included: Consumer Price 
Index, unemployment and average house price. This was a revised list taking into 
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consideration the effect of multicollinearity reported in Table 4.15 (Chapter Four). No 
single model could be constructed based on the liquidation measure and the variables 
available to the researcher. 
Given the significant economic and social strain that company failure places on the 
community as a whole, regular up-date research is recommended with the construction of a 
quarterly regional risk index incorporating other regions within New Zealand. For this to be 
possible the limitations of available databases such as those of the Companies Office used 
in this study must be seriously considered. Perhaps the major contribution of this study is 
to highlight such limitations and direct policy makers towards possible solutions. These 
alterations would allow replication of the techniques used by this study in the future 
providing accurate and reliable results. 
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